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ABSTRACT 
It is generally accepted in both theory and practice of 
arbitration that there are two basic forms of arbitration, ad hoc and 
institutional. This long established dichotomy has rarely been 
questioned, and it has mostly worked well in international 
arbitration practice. 
The present contribution investigates the traditional distinction 
between ad hoc and institutional arbitration in more detail by 
looking at “borderline cases”, i.e. constellations that cannot easily 
be allocated to one of these two categories. Four groups of 
borderline cases are discussed: (1) UNCITRAL arbitrations, in 
particular those administered by arbitral institutions; (2) cases in 
which the parties have chosen institutional rules, but not the issuing 
institution (and vice versa), (3) the modification of institutional 
rules by the parties and the identification of a possible “mandatory” 
core of institutional rules, and (4) “mix and match” (or “hybrid”) 
arbitrations combining one arbitral institution’s rules with the 
case’s administration by a different arbitral institution. 
By identifying the factors that were decisive for these borderline 
cases being regarded as institutional or ad hoc, the article is trying 
to gain insight into the core characteristics underlying each 
arbitration category. Drawing on these insights, it develops and 
explains a novel definition of “institutional arbitration”. 
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In both theory and practice of arbitration, it is generally agreed that 
there are two basic forms of arbitration, ad hoc and institutional.1 This 
truism is so self-understood that it has rarely been challenged, and few 
attempts have been made to identify what precisely makes an arbitration 
institutional or ad hoc. The latter is somewhat surprising, given that the 
principle of party autonomy prevailing in arbitration can result in a great 
variety of dispute settlement designs that may not always be easily 
accommodated by these two categories that have interchangeably been 
referred to as “forms”, “kind”, 2  “types” or “categories” of arbitration. 
(Article IV(6) of the 1961 European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 3  one of the few provisions in international 
arbitration law that expressly addresses the distinction between ad hoc and 
institutional arbitration, speaks of “mode of arbitration”.) 
The present article seeks to investigate the traditional distinction 
between the two forms of arbitration by looking at “borderline cases”, i.e., 
constellations that are not easily allocated to either category. By identifying 
the factors eventually decisive for making the respective arbitrations 
institutional or ad hoc, it is hoped that insight can be gained into the core 
characteristics of each arbitration type. The article will proceed as follows: 
In Part II, it will outline accepted definitions of the two traditional 
arbitration categories, before clarifying in Part III whether and why the 
distinction matters at all. Part IV turns to four types of borderline cases and 
the lessons to be learned from them for the delimitation of arbitration 
categories. Part V summarizes the results and draws consequences by 




1 Bovis Lend Lease Pte. Ltd. v. Jay-Tech Marine & Projects Pte. Ltd., [2005] SGHC 91, ¶ 21 (Sing.) 
[hereinafter Bovis]; Gerald Aksen, Ad Hoc Versus Institutional Arbitration, 2(1) ICC BULL. 8, 8 
(1991); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 169 (2d ed. 2014); P. A. 
Lalive, Problèmes Relatifs à l’Arbitrage International Commercial, 120 ACADÉMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 568, 664 (1967); JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 3-4 (2003); MICHAEL MCILWRATH & JOHN 
SAVAGE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE ¶ 1-063 (2010); 
Jan Heiner Nedden & Axel Benjamin Herzberg, Einleitung, in ICC-SCHO/DIS-SCHO: 
PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZU DEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSORDNUNGEN 1, ¶ 9 (Jan Heiner Nedden & Axel 
Benjamin Herzberg eds., 2014); Anne Véronique Schlaepfer & Angelina M. Petti, Institutional 
Versus Ad Hoc Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN SWITZERLAND: A HANDBOOK FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 13 (Elliott Geisinger & Nathalie Voser eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
2 Insigma Technology Co. Ltd. v. Alstom Technology Ltd., [2009] SGCA 24, 3 Singapore Law 
Reports (Reissue) 936, ¶ 34 (Sing.) [hereinafter Insigma v. Alstom]. 
3 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, opened for signature Apr. 21, 
1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter 1961 Geneva Convention]. 
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II. ACCEPTED DEFINITIONS OF ARBITRATION CATEGORIES 
A. The Traditional Ad Hoc/Institutional Arbitration Dichotomy 
The importance of party autonomy is well established in international 
arbitration. 4  Its exercise can take various forms. One of these forms, 
namely party autonomy to submit to arbitration, is primarily exercised by 
the parties jointly deciding whether to go to ad hoc arbitration or to choose 
institutional arbitration. 5  It is therefore not surprising that these two 
traditional modes of arbitration are most often discussed with a view to the 
parties’ choice between them,6 and the categories of ad hoc arbitration on 
one hand and institutional arbitration on the other are generally presented in 
terms of their perceived advantages and disadvantages. 7  This approach 
accordingly regards the dichotomy of arbitration categories as a menu that 
parties can choose from: There are set meals (institutional arbitration), and 
there is dining à la carte (ad hoc arbitration). 
When it comes to defining the two categories on the menu, it is 
interesting that no truly universally used definition for either ad hoc 
arbitration or institutional arbitration can be identified.8 In spite of this, the 
definitions used in major arbitration textbooks are at least quite similar. In 
addition, many arbitration treatises also agree by first defining institutional 
arbitration and addressing ad hoc arbitration second, thereby indicating ad 
hoc arbitration’s default character.  
  
																																								 																				
4  THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 21-22 (2d ed. 2007); 
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 46 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN]; 
NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 6.07 (6th 
ed. 2015). 
5 Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Party Autonomy and Case Management¾Experiences and Suggestions 
of an Arbitrator, 11 SCHIEDSVZ 1, 2 (2013); BORN, supra note 1, at 168-69; Kinga Timár, The 
Legal Relationship Between the Parties and the Arbitral Institution, 2013(1) ELTE L.J. 103, 105 
(2013). 
6 CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at 10, 626; BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 4, ¶¶ 1.140, 2.79; Timár, 
supra note 5, at 105-07; ANDREW TWEEDDALE & KEREN TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF 
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES ¶ 3.01 (2005). 
7 See BORN, supra note 1, at 171; Dana H. Freyer, Practical Considerations in Drafting Dispute 
Resolution Provisions in International Commercial Contracts: A US Perspective, 15(4) J. INT’L 
ARB. 7, 20-23 (1998); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 4, ¶¶ 1.140-56; Schlaepfer & Petti, supra 
note 1, at 14-17, 20-21; William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make A 
Difference?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 52-59 (1996). 
8 Pilar Perales Viscasillas, The Role of Arbitral Institutions Under the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, 6 LIMA ARB. 26, 31 (2014). 
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B. Defining Institutional Arbitration 
In doing so, an “institutional” arbitration has been described as one that 
is administered by a specialist arbitral institution under its own rules of 
arbitration.9 According to another definition, institutional arbitrations are 
conducted pursuant to institutional arbitration rules, almost always 
overseen by an administrative authority with responsibility for various 
aspects relating to constituting the arbitral tribunal, fixing the arbitrators’ 
compensation and similar matters. 10  A yet different definition regards 
institutional arbitration as an arbitration procedure conducted under the 
auspices of or administered or directed by an existing institution.11  
The above range of definitions indicates that no single comprehensive 
definition of institutional arbitration has yet been developed. 12 
Nevertheless, the already mentioned attempts at a definition as well as a 
few others13 show significant similarities by mostly employing the same 
two components: The institution’s administration of arbitration 
proceedings, and its publication of institutional arbitration rules. 
Differences primarily result from the emphasis, if any, that is put on one or 
the other component. While some consider the administration by the 
institution as the more important factor,14 others focus primarily on the 




9 BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 4, ¶ 1.140; Bovis, supra note 1, ¶ 21; Slate, supra note 7, at 47; 
MIRKO WIDDASCHECK, DIE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES ALS SEMI-INSTITUTIONELLE 
SCHIEDSVERFAHRENSREGELN 14 (2016); see also CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., 
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 33 (2d ed. 2006); Rolf A. Schütze, 
Introduction, in INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION 1, ¶ 1 (Rolf A. Schütze ed., 2013). 
10 BORN, supra note 1, at 169. 
11 LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-6; see also Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 32. 
12 BARBARA ALICJA WARWAS, THE LIABILITY OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS: LEGITIMACY 
CHALLENGES AND FUNCTIONAL RESPONSES 20 (2017); see also Lalive, supra note 1, at 664. 
13 See also KARL HEINZ SCHWAB & GERHARD WALTER, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT ¶ 10 (7th ed. 
2005); TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, ¶ 3.01. 
14 Helena Hsi Chia Chen, A Review of the Taiwanese Court’s Ruling on Ad Hoc Arbitral Awards, 
20 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 89, 92 (2012); JACOB GRIERSON & ANNET VAN HOOFT, ARBITRATING 
UNDER THE 2012 ICC RULES 28 (2012); LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-6; Perales Viscasillas, supra 
note 8, at 32; Friederike Schäfer, Institutionelle Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit – Allgemeines, in 
HANDBUCH SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT ¶ 308 (Hellwig Torggler et al. eds., 2017); Schlaepfer & 
Petti, supra note 1, at 19; PETER SCHLOSSER, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN 
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT ¶ 599 (2d ed. 1989); WEI SUN & MELANIE WILLEMS, ARBITRATION IN 
CHINA 10 (2015) ; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, ¶ 3.01. 
15 BORN, supra note 1, at 169; BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 33; SCHWAB & WALTER, 
supra note 13, ¶ 10; HERMAN VERBIST ET AL., ICC ARBITRATION IN PRACTICE 10 (2d ed. 2015) .  
16 BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 4, ¶ 1.140; Schütze, supra note 9, ¶ 1; Slate, supra note 7, at 47; 
P.J. VAN OMMEREN, RAPPORT AU CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DE L’ARBITRAGE 2 (1961). 
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C. Defining Ad Hoc Arbitration 
In contrast, ad hoc arbitration has primarily been defined as the 
opposite of institutional arbitration, as a category encompassing all 
arbitrations that are not institutional.17 “Negative” definitions of this kinds 
describe ad hoc arbitration as arbitrations that are conducted without the 
involvement of any arbitral institution, 18  that are independent of all 
institutions,19 that are conducted without the benefit of an appointing and 
administrative authority or (generally) preexisting arbitration rules20 or that 
are not administered by an arbitral institution. 21  Almost mirroring the 
various attempts at defining institutional arbitration,22 they thereby range 
from no institutional involvement at all via neither institutional 
administration nor use of institutional rules to (merely) no institutional 
administration. The prevailing “negative” approach of these definitions 
reflects the default nature of ad hoc arbitration, given that an arbitration 
will be ad hoc whenever parties are silent about their desired arbitration 
mode.23 
Positive descriptions of this arbitration type are only rarely 
encountered. An example can be found in Article I(2)(b) of the 1961 
Geneva Convention, where ad hoc arbitration is defined as “settlement by 
arbitrators appointed for each case”. 
D. Challenges to the Traditional Dichotomy 
In recent years, the traditional ad hoc/institutional dichotomy has 
occasionally been challenged in legal writings. Authors have inter alia 
pointed out that the borderline between the two categories is not always 
clear,24 and that difficulties are encountered in certain cases to distinguish 
between them.25 Much in the same way, it has been regarded as generally 
inappropriate to only consider the differences between ad hoc and 
																																								 																				
17 Pieter Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2 YEARBOOK COM. ARB. 172, ¶ 
2.4 (1977). 
18 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 4, ¶ 253; BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 4, ¶ 1.140. 
19 LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-9; Schlaepfer & Petti, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
20 BORN, supra note 1, at 169. 
21 DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON ET AL., RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION ¶ 2-006 (23th ed. 2007); Jennifer 
Kirby, Insigma Technology Co. Ltd. v. Alstom Technology Ltd.: SIAC Can Administer Cases Under 
the ICC Rules?!?, 25(3) ARB. INT’L 319, 324 (2009); BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 35; 
SUN & WILLEMS, supra note 14, at 10. 
22 Supra Section II.B. 
23 LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-5; Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 35. 
24 Jean-Babtiste Racine, Note, 22 Janvier 2010, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 2010(3) 
REVUE DE L’ARBITRAGE 571, 581-82 (2010); TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, ¶ 3.02; 
CHRISTIAN WOLF, DIE INSTITUTIONELLE HANDELSSCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 10 (1992). 
25 Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 51. 
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institutional arbitration in the extreme without considering hybrid models.26 
Others have stressed that the distinction in any case should not be 
overestimated.27 
The present contribution takes up these challenges and tests their 
justification by looking at a number of “borderline cases”, i.e., cases in 
which the seemingly clear-cut line between institutional and ad hoc 
arbitration has proven difficult to draw. In investigating such borderline 
constellations and their treatment both in case law and in academic 
discussions, an attempt will be made to determine what lessons, if any, can 
be learned from them for the general distinction between arbitration 
categories. 
III. WHY DOES THE DISTINCTION MATTER? 
Before we turn to these borderline cases, it seems appropriate to ask 
why the distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbitration, clear-cut 
or not, actually matters. Commentators have stressed in a generic manner 
that institutional arbitrations are different, both in fact and law, from ad hoc 
arbitrations,28 and that these differences are vitally important.29 In looking 
for the source of these differences, three possible reasons come to mind. 
A. Differences in Applicable Procedural Rules 
First of all, the distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbitration 
seemingly matters because of the different rules of procedure that apply in 
these arbitrations. Indeed, the difference between the parties “own” rules of 
procedure established in an ad hoc arbitration and the time-tested, but 
generic procedural rules laid down by established arbitral institutions, 
sometimes likened to the difference between a tailor-made suit and one that 
is bought “off the peg”,30 has often been stressed. 
However, upon closer scrutiny it becomes clear that the differences in 
the applicable procedural rules do not (or at least not primarily) depend on 
the arbitration type that a specific arbitration belongs to, but on the specific 
rules that apply to a particular arbitration due to either the parties’ 
agreement, or according to the default regime of the lex arbitri. In other 
words, the decisive factor is not the distinction between ad hoc arbitration 
on one hand and institutional arbitration on the other, but rather the specific 
																																								 																				
26  JEFFREY WAINCYMER, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶ 3.16 
(2012). 
27 Racine, supra note 24, at 581-82. 
28 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 4, ¶ 812. 
29 BORN, supra note 1, at 169. 
30 BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 4, ¶ 1.143; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, ¶ 3.77. 
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set of rules governing the specific arbitration proceedings. In this respect, it 
should be kept in mind that significant differences also exist between 
different institutional rules and the role they allocate to the administering 
institution, 31  sometimes referred to as “hands-off approach” (as e.g., 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) arbitrations) vs. “hands-
on approach” (as notably ICC International Court of Arbitration (ICC) 
arbitrations).32 Notwithstanding the differences in procedural rules, these 
arbitrations are nevertheless indiscriminately recognized as 
“institutional”.33 In fact, an arbitration involving an arbitral institution that 
fulfils only very limited tasks may well appear closer to an ad hoc 
proceeding than to a fully-administered institutional arbitration. It is 
therefore submitted that the differences in applicable procedural rules are 
not what gives relevance to the precise delimitation between arbitration 
categories. 
B. Practical Differences  
A second group of reasons why the ad hoc/institutional distinction 
matters may be referred to as “practical differences”, in the sense that these 
differences do not directly lie in the rules of procedure applicable to the 
two types of arbitrations. Some of these practical differences are direct 
consequences of the procedure in ad hoc vs. institutional arbitration,34 as 
e.g., the strategic options available to a claimant when confronted with a 
respondent who refuses to nominate an arbitrator. Insofar, differences of 
this type are mere extensions of the differences in the respective rules of 
procedure addressed earlier.35 
Other practical differences are less directly determined by procedural 
rules. An example is the extra cachet that institutional awards supposedly 
carry in comparison to awards rendered ad hoc. 36  In an oft-quoted 
assessment, this not strictly judicial, but rather ‘soft’ factor has been 
described as there being “something more majestic, more dignified and 
more comforting” about institutional arbitral awards. 37  However, it is 
submitted that this perception and the practical consequences emanating 
therefrom (as e.g., an easier enforceability of institutional awards) depend 
																																								 																				
31 Timár, supra note 5, at 107. 
32 See RÉMY GERBAY, THE FUNCTIONS OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS 45 (2016); PRACTITIONER’S 
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 18.20 (Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., 
2009); see also LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-19. 
33 Infra Section IV.A.3.(c). 
34 See MCILWRATH & SAVAGE, supra note 1, ¶ 1-146. 
35 Supra Section III.A. 
36 LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-20; BORN, supra note 1, at 171; BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra 
note 9, at 36; Schlaepfer & Petti, supra note 1, at 20. 
37 Francis J. Higgins et al., Pitfalls in International Commercial Arbitration, 35 BUS. L. 1035, 1051 
(1980). 
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less on the arbitration being “institutional”, but rather on the particular 
institution’s reputation in the field. Instead of the cachet of institutional 
arbitration as a category, it is therefore the cachet of a particular arbitral 
institution that makes the practical difference. 38  The same is true for 
another practical advantage of institutional arbitration that is sometimes 
mentioned, namely the “comfort” element in an arbitral institution’s 
existence: 39  As parties will draw such comfort from a particular 
institution’s experience and reputation, that institution’s involvement in an 
arbitration makes the difference, and not the proceedings’ categorization as 
“institutional”. 
C. Legal Differences That Depend on the Precise Definition of 
Arbitration Categories 
Accordingly, it is but a third reason that can make the precise 
distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbitration relevant: The exact 
delimitation of these traditional kinds of arbitration matters where legal 
rules of arbitration law, either of international or domestic provenance, 
attach legal consequences to this distinction by distinguishing between the 
two categories. Such rules of law are not common, but they do exist. In 
addressing them, it is helpful to differentiate according to the consequences 
that a rule attaches to the ad hoc/institutional distinction. The result is a 
group of legal provisions we can refer to as “category inclusive” rules of 
arbitration law, to be addressed first, before we turn to a second group of 
“category exclusive” rules of arbitration law. 
1. “Category Inclusive” Rules of Arbitration Law ¾ The first group of 
arbitration law provisions refers to ad hoc and/or institutional arbitrations, 
but treats both types of arbitration alike. Category inclusive rules therefore 
connect no legal consequences to the ad hoc/institutional distinction. An 
example from international arbitration law is Article I(2) of the 1958 New 
York Convention,40 which provides that “[t]he term ‘arbitral awards’ shall 
include not only awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but 
also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the parties have 
submitted.” Although the reference to “permanent arbitral bodies” was 
historically inserted in order to accommodate permanent bodies like 
Arbitration Commissions for External Trade that were a feature of 
jurisprudence in the then-Socialist States,41 case law under Article I(2) of 
																																								 																				
38 See LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-20; BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 9, at 36. 
39 Lalive, supra note 1, at 668; LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-20. 
40  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for 
signature June 15, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter 1958 New York Convention]. 
41 RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY 
ON THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 21 (Herbert Kronke et al. eds., 2010); MARIKE R. P. PAULSSON, 
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the 1958 New York Convention has also applied the term to arbitral 
institutions42  like the Court of Arbitration at the Bulgarian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry,43 the Arbitral Tribunal at the Vienna Commodity 
Exchange, 44  the Arbitration Board of the Coffee Trade Federation in 
London,45 the Arbitral Tribunal according to the Conditions of Business of 
the Waren-Verein der Hamburger Börse e.V.46 or the ICC International 
Court of Arbitration.47 Similar provisions can be found in Article I(2)(b) of 
the 1961 Geneva Convention, stating that “the term ‘arbitration’ shall mean 
not only settlement by arbitrators appointed for each case (ad hoc 
arbitration) but also by permanent arbitral institutions”,48 and Article 2(a) 
of the 1985/2006 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 49  which provides that “arbitration” means “any arbitration 
whether or not administered by a permanent arbitral institution”. In 
domestic arbitration laws, comparable provisions are inter alia 
Article 182(1) of the Swiss Arbitration Law (IPRG),50  § 1042(3) of the 
German Code of Civil Procedure, Article 832 of the Italian Code of Civil 
Procedure, Articles 1446, 1452-1454, 1456, 1464(3) and 1508 of the 
French Code of Civil Procedure, and section 24(2) of the 1996 English 
Arbitration Act. 
Legal rules of this type primarily aim at confirming the existence and 
legitimacy of institutional arbitration.51 Today they may seem superfluous, 
as they merely confirm an internationally recognized principle.52 Due to 
their inclusive purpose, it does not matter under such provisions how the 
terms employed therein¾“permanent arbitral bodies”, “permanent arbitral 
																																								 																																							 																																							 													
THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION IN ACTION 121 (2016). More details on such arbitration 
commissions, also see Lalive, supra note 1, at 667-68. 
42 Equating “permanent arbitral bodies” under Article I(2) of the 1958 New York Convention with 
arbitral institutions, see SUN & WILLEMS, supra note 14, at 12. 
43 Cassazione Sezione Civile [Cass.], Apr. 17, 1978, 4 YEARBOOK COM. ARB. 282, 282-83 (1979) 
(It.).  
44 Corte di Appello di Ancona [App.], June 8, 1981, 8 YEARBOOK COM. ARB. 389, 389 (1983) (It.). 
45 Tribunal Supremo [S.T.S.], Oct. 8, 1981, 8 YEARBOOK COM. ARB. 406, 406 (1983) (Spain). 
46  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 2, 1982, III ZR 85/81, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1267 (1268), 1983 (Ger.).  
47 FG Hemisphere Associates LLC v Democratic Republic of Congo [2010] NSWSC 1394, ¶¶ 8, 10 
(Austl.). 
48 See Art. I(2)(b) of the 1961 Geneva Convention, supra Section II.C. 
49 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration (2006), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitrati 
on/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. 
50 Article 182(1) of the Swiss IPRG provides that the parties may regulate the arbitral procedure 
directly or by reference to rules of arbitration (schiedsgerichtliche Verfahrensordnung). The term 
“reference to rules of arbitration” is generally equated with a choice of institutional arbitration; see 
BERNHARD BERGER & FRANZ KELLERHALS, INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ARBITRATION IN 
SWITZERLAND ¶ 22 (3d ed. 2015). 
51 On Article I(2) of the 1958 New York Convention, see FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra 
note 4, ¶ 253; see also BORN, supra note 1, at 2920. 
52 PAULSSON, supra note 41, at 120. 
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institutions” or similar¾are precisely defined, because awards emanating 
from such bodies are treated in the same way as other arbitral awards, 
notably those rendered in ad hoc arbitrations.53  Accordingly, “category 
inclusive” provisions make the distinction between ad hoc and institutional 
arbitration a moot point, leaving the precise delimitation of the two 
categories irrelevant. 
2. “Category Exclusive” Rules of Arbitration Law ¾ The position is 
different under “category exclusive” rules of arbitration law that refer to a 
particular arbitration category in order to treat it differently from another 
arbitration category. Provisions of this type are rare when compared to 
“category inclusive” legal provisions, but do occasionally occur.  
(a) The 1961 Geneva Convention as an Example ¾ Examples from 
international arbitration law can be found in Article IV of the 1961 Geneva 
Convention. Under the heading “Organization of the arbitration”, 
Article IV(1) provides that the parties to an arbitration agreement are free 
to submit their disputes to either a permanent arbitral institution 
(Article IV(1)(a)) or an ad hoc arbitral procedure (Article IV(1)(b)), and 
stipulates different rules about the organization of these different “modes” 
of arbitration.54 Article IV(5) lays down a procedure for the determination 
of a permanent arbitral institution where the parties have agreed to submit 
their disputes to an arbitral institution, but have not determined which.55 
Both Article IV(1)(a) and (b) as well as Article IV(5) of the 1961 Geneva 
Convention therefore only apply to institutional or ad hoc arbitrations and 
are accordingly “category exclusive”. (In contrast, the neighbouring 
provisions in Articles IV(4)(d) and (6) of the same convention arguably 
belong to the ‘category inclusive’ type discussed earlier.56) 
(b) PRC Arbitration Law as an Example ¾ Among domestic 
arbitration laws, the most prominent “category exclusive” rule is probably 
Article 16 in conjunction with Article 18 of the Arbitration Law of the 
Peoples’ Republic of China. Article 16(2) of the Chinese Arbitration Law 
																																								 																				
53 See MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUR ZPO ¶ 7 (Jens Adolphsen et al. eds., 2013). 
54 See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 2, 1982, III ZR 85/81, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1267 (1268), 1983 (Ger.). 
55  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 2, 1982, III ZR 85/81, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1267, 1983 (Ger.) concerned an imperfectly drafted 
arbitration clause with an unclear reference to “Hamburger freundschaftliche Arbitrage aufgrund 
der Waren-Verein der Hamburger Boerse e.V./Arbitraggio amichevole in conformita alle 
condizioni del Waren-Verein der Hamburger Boerse e.V.”: The German Federal Supreme Court 
held that both arbitral tribunals of the Hamburger freundschaftliche Arbitrage and arbitral tribunals 
under the Rules of the Waren-Verein der Hamburger Börse e.V. equally qualify as “permanent 
arbitral institutions” in accordance with Article IV(1) of the 1961 Geneva Convention, but declared 
the arbitration clause invalid because it remained unclear which of the two arbitral institutions it 
referred to. The decision has been criticized for not applying Article IV(5), (6) of the 1961 Geneva 
Convention; see SCHLOSSER, supra note 14, ¶ 559. 
56 Supra Section III.C.1. 
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expressly lists “[t]he arbitration commission chosen” as one of the 
mandatory requirements of a valid arbitration agreement, and Article 18 of 
the Arbitration Law provides that the arbitration agreement will be 
considered invalid if the parties fail to designate an arbitration institution in 
the arbitration agreement. The requirement to choose an “arbitration 
commission”¾a term that equals the more commonly used “arbitration 
institution” 57¾is particular to the PRC’s current arbitration law 58  and 
effectively rules out any ad hoc arbitration in mainland China.59 While this 
means that the precise distinction between ad hoc and institutional 
arbitration matters under the arbitration law of the PRC, the general 
delimitation of the two categories does not necessarily follow the same 
principles used elsewhere: This is so because Article 10 of the Arbitration 
Law provides a specific definition of the term “arbitration commission”,60 
although its applicability in the context of Articles 16 and 18 is not entirely 
uncontroversial.61 According to commentators, the purpose of the Chinese 
lex arbitri’s focus on institutional arbitration is to allow the government to 
conventiently monitor arbitral institutions and cases,62 a goal less easily 
reached in ad hoc arbitration. 
(c) Taiwan Arbitration Law as an Example ¾ A further example of 
“category exclusive” domestic arbitration rules is provided by the 
arbitration law of Taiwan. In the Jin Cheng Feng case, the Taiwanese 
courts adopted a (controversially) narrow interpretation of Article 37(1) of 
the 1998 Taiwan Arbitration Act and held that only an arbitration 
institution’s award is binding on the parties and has the same validity as a 
final court judgment. 63  A possible reason for this interpretation is that 
Taiwanese arbitration law does not include a counterpart to Article 2(a) of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law,64 a “category inclusive” provision mentioned 
																																								 																				
57 John Mo, Probing the Uniformity of the Arbitration System in the PRC, 17(3) J. INT’L ARB. 1, 29 
(2000); Jingzhou Tao & Clarisse von Wunschheim, Articles 16 and 18 of the PRC Arbitration 
Law: The Great Wall of China for Foreign Arbitration Institutions, 23(2) ARB. INT’L 309, 311 
(2007). 
58 Tao & von Wunschheim, supra note 57, at 311. 
59 Chen, supra note 14, at 105-06; Mo, supra note 57, at 29; SUN & WILLEMS, supra note 14, at 11; 
Tao & von Wunschheim, supra note 57, at 312; Jane Willems, The Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction at 
Risk: The Case of Hybrid and Asymmetrical Arbitration Agreements, in THE POWERS AND DUTIES 
OF AN ARBITRATOR: LIBER AMICORUM PIERRE A. KARRER 403, 407 (Patricia Shaugnessy & 
Sherlin Tung eds., 2017); Jian Zhou, Arbitration Agreements in China: Battles on Designation of 
Arbitral Institution and Ad Hoc Arbitration, 23(2) J. INT’L ARB. 145, 146 (2006). 
60 Mo, supra note 57, at 22. 
61 See Tao & von Wunschheim, supra note 57, at 311. 
62 Zhou, supra note 59, at 169. 
63 See Chen, supra note 14, at 89; see generally Houchih Kuo, Refusal of Taiwanese Court to 
Recognize Ad Hoc Arbitration: Implications and the Future of Ad Hoc Arbitration in Taiwan, 
ASIAN DISP. REV. 59 (2012). 
64 Kuo, supra note 63, at 59. 
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earlier65 that expressly defines arbitration as any arbitration whether or not 
administered by a permanent arbitral institution. In light of the current case 
law, the distinction between ad hoc and institutional arbitration matters 
under Taiwan arbitration law as it stands,66 although Taiwanese scholars 
argue that both categories of arbitration should be permitted under the 
Taiwan Arbitration Act. 67  This does not necessarily mean that the 
delimitation between these two arbitration categories as developed in other 
contexts can also be used in Taiwan arbitration law, because¾not unlike 
the arbitration law of the PRC¾Article 54 of the Taiwan Arbitration Act 
provides its own definition of the term “arbitration institution” that 
effectively covers only arbitral institutions whose establishment has been 
approved by the Taiwanese government.68 
(d) Need for an Autonomous Construction of Each “Category 
Exclusive” Rule ¾ Under “category exclusive” rules of arbitration law,69 
the precise definition of the arbitration category (or categories) employed 
therein accordingly matters, because it determines whether the legal 
consequences provided for in such provisions are triggered. The distinction 
between the categories of institutional arbitration, ad hoc arbitration and 
conceivable other types of arbitration is therefore of legal relevance under 
such rules of law. 
While it is tempting to conclude that this fact automatically grants 
relevance to the topic discussed here, a note of caution is in order: The 
general distinction between arbitration categories to be attempted in the 
following does not necessarily have to dovetail with the definition of 
arbitration categories used in individual provisions of arbitration law, may 
they be domestic or international. The reason is simple: Each of these 
provisions has to be construed in accordance with the rules of interpretation 
applicable to the respective legal norm, and these rules may well differ. 
Interpretation rules furthermore often look to the purpose of the respective 
provision, its legislative history and systematic relationship with other 
provisions of law, and these factors will frequently be unique to a particular 
“category exclusive” rule of arbitration law.  
  
																																								 																				
65 Supra Section III.C.1. 
66  Kuo, supra note 63, at 60 (stresses that parties are strongly advised not to choose ad hoc 
arbitration in Taiwan.). 
67 See Chen, supra note 14, at 97 with numerous references; Kuo, supra note 63, at 61. 
68 Kuo, supra note 63, at 60. 
69 Supra Section III.C.2. 
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D. Merits of a Comparative Law and Practice Perspective on 
Arbitration Categories 
In contrast, the present article adopts a comparative approach, looking 
at “borderline cases” that have been addressed under various domestic 
arbitration laws and institutional arbitration rules, and trying to identify a 
common core of principles underlying the treatment of these cases. As a 
result, the conclusions to be developed below are not tel quel applicable to 
each existing provision that distinguishes between arbitration categories, 
and should not be so understood. 
What are then the merits of the comparative law and practice 
perspective followed here? In response to this well-justified question, one 
may refer to the traditional purposes of comparative legal research: Such 
research has famously been described as an “école de vérité” which extends 
and enriches the “supply of solutions” available,70 and offers jurists the 
opportunity of finding a better solution to a pertinent problem in their time 
and place.71 An important practical use of comparative law is its function as 
a tool in the construction of domestic and international legal rules, in the 
area of arbitration as much as elsewhere.72 As issues of construction from 
time to time concern the specific question tackled in the present article, its 
results may prove helpful to arbitrators, courts and counsel in determining 
where the line between ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration 
precisely runs. Last but not least, the arguments to be developed below are 
a modest contribution to the ongoing discussion about the theory of 
arbitration, 73  including the alleged “institutionalization” of international 
commercial arbitration.74 
IV. BORDERLINE CASES¾AND WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THEM 
As already indicated,75 the traditional ad hoc/institutional arbitration 
dichotomy has increasingly been challenged in recent years, and it has been 
pointed out that the boundaries between these established categories can 
become blurred. The latter phenomenon becomes apparent in “borderline 
cases”, i.e., cases that cannot without difficulties be filed under one of the 
two categories. Four such borderline constellations will be investigated, in 
																																								 																				
70  Ernst Zitelmann, Aufgaben und Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichung, 5 DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-
ZEITUNG 329, 329-32 (1900). 
71 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 15 (3d ed. 1998). 
72 See Jürgen Basedow, Comparative Law and Its Clients, 62(4) AM. J. COMP. L. 821, 839-42 
(2014); ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 71,  at 18. 
73 See BORN, supra note 1, at 214-17; FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 4, ¶¶ 44-57; 
LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶¶ 5-1 to 5-33. 
74 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 4, ¶ 53. 
75 Supra Section II.D. 
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order to determine what lessons can be learned from their treatment in case 
law and in academic discussions for the distinction between institutional 
and ad hoc arbitration in general. 
All four constellations to be addressed below have one factor in 
common: They are the result of party autonomy, the fundamental principle 
of all arbitration that, at least in principle, also applies in institutional 
arbitration. 76  Where the parties have exercised their autonomy in a 
particular manner, the traditionally clear-cut line between ad hoc and 
institutional arbitration blurs. 
A. UNCITRAL Arbitrations Involving Arbitral Institutions 
The first group of borderline cases are arbitral proceedings conducted 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The well-known set of rules was 
initially adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (hereinafter “UNCITRAL”) in 1976 in order to contribute to the 
development of harmonious international economic relations through the 
establishment of rules for ad hoc arbitration that are acceptable in countries 
with different legal, social and economic systems.77 After their successful 
use by parties in a wide variety of circumstances covering a broad range of 
disputes,78 the Rules underwent a partial revision in 2010.  
As UNCITRAL itself does not administer arbitrations, 79  the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were designed as a set of stand-alone 
arbitration rules not necessarily depending on institutional support. 
Arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules therefore display one of the 
features commonly associated with institutional arbitration80 (namely the 
use of preexisting arbitration rules), but not the other (the proceedings’ 
administration by an institution). This characteristic has led to controversial 
discussions about the position of UNCITRAL arbitrations within the 
traditionally “bifocal” world of ad hoc and institutional arbitrations. 
																																								 																				
76  Andrea Carlevaris, The Bounds of Party Autonomy in Institutional Arbitration, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION UNDER REVIEW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN BEECHEY 103, 103-
04 (Andrea Carlevaris et al. ed., 2015); Freyer, supra note 7, at 14; Schäfer, supra note 14, ¶ 339; 
MAXI SCHERER ET AL., ARBITRATING UNDER THE 2014 LCIA RULES: A USER’S GUIDE 36 (2015); 
SHAI WADE ET AL., A COMMENTARY ON THE LCIA ARBITRATION RULES 2014 ¶ I-019 (2015). 
77 G.A. Res. 31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976). 
78 G.A. Res. 65/22 (Dec. 6, 2010); Sarah Grimmer, The Expanded Role of the Appointing Authority 
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 2010, 28(5) J. INT’L ARB. 501, 501 (2011). 
79 CLYDE CROFT ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES ¶ 6.1 (2013); Stephen 
L. Drymer, The Revised 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: New Rules/New Roles for 
Designating and Appointing Authorities, 28(4) ASA BULL. 869, 871 (2010); Paolo Michele 
Patocchi & Tilman Niedermaier, UNCITRAL Rules, in INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, 
1007, ¶ 13. 
80 Supra Section II.B. 
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1. Arbitration Proceedings According to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules Without any Institution’s Involvement ¾ As a preliminary issue, it 
could be considered whether an arbitration conducted in accordance with 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but without any arbitral institution 
being involved, is already something different than a “normal” (i.e., non-
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) ad hoc arbitration. If this assumption was 
accurate, every arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules would 
constitute a “borderline case”, with such arbitrations possibly forming a 
separate category of arbitrations. And indeed, commentators have argued in 
favour of such a view, seemingly because the use of preexisting arbitration 
rules (as notably the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules) decisively distinguishes such 
arbitrations from typical ad hoc arbitrations.81 
It is correct that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were designed to 
remedy the lack of established procedures that can be a disadvantage when 
proceeding ad hoc,82 and that their rules of procedure are precise enough to 
preclude the need for any subsidiary recourse to national arbitration laws.83 
It is nevertheless clear that the UNCITRAL Rules were developed for use 
in ad hoc arbitrations,84 and there is no indication that the drafters intended 
the Rules’ off-the-shelf provisions to change the ad hoc character of 
resulting proceedings. In his commentary on the 1976 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Pieter Sanders, the principal drafter and “father” of the 
Rules, specifically stressed that the UNCITRAL Rules “do not compete 
with institutional arbitration since, unlike the arbitration rules of every 
arbitral institution, the UNCITRAL Rules do not provide for the 
administration of the arbitration”,85 and that accordingly “arbitration under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules cannot be regarded as institutional, 
administered arbitration”.86 Their historical background thus clarifies that 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules merely ease the exercise of procedural 
party autonomy by providing expertly-designed default rules to govern the 
arbitration proceedings, in place of the lex arbitri’s otherwise applicable 
default provisions. However, they do not change the nature of UNCITRAL 
arbitrations as ad hoc arbitrations.87 
What does this discussion teach us about the distinction between 
arbitration categories? It clarifies that the use of preexisting arbitration 
																																								 																				
81 In this sense see SCHLOSSER, supra note 14, ¶ 179. 
82 Freyer, supra note 7, at 23. 
83 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 4, ¶ 201. 
84 See Aksen, supra note 1, at 11; BORN, supra note 1, at 173; FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, 
supra note 4, ¶ 253; Slate, supra note 7, at 53. 
85 Sanders, supra note 17, ¶ 2.2. 
86 Id. ¶ 2.4. 
87 Freyer, supra note 7, at 23; Patocchi & Niedermaier, supra note 79, ¶ 13; Perales Viscasillas, 
supra note 8, at 38-39; Schlaepfer & Petti, supra note 1, at 14; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra 
note 6, ¶ 3.84 ; probably see also Chen, supra note 14, at 92. 
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rules alone does not make an arbitration “institutional”,88 although the use 
of arbitration rules not tailor-made for a particular proceeding is one of the 
usual components in the prevailing definitions of institutional arbitration. 
The application of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules alone therefore leaves 
an arbitration’s ad hoc character unaffected, without turning it into a third 
(“hybrid”) type of arbitration. 
2. Arbitration Proceedings According to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules with an Institution Acting as Appointing Authority ¾ More 
frequently, the role of the appointing authority under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules has been the focus of suggestions to treat certain 
proceedings under the UNCITRAL Rules as a special category of 
arbitrations.  
(a) Appointing Authorities Under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules ¾ Already the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provided for an 
“appointing authority” to be agreed upon by the parties, and for the 
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to 
designate an appointing authority if the parties have not so agreed. Under 
the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules, an appointing authority had the task to 
appoint arbitrator(s) in case parties or party-appointed arbitrators had failed 
to make a necessary appointment (Articles 6-8); in addition, it decided on 
challenges of arbitrators (Article 12). The 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules maintained these tasks of appointing authorities (in Articles 6, 8-10, 
13(4) and 14(2)), but added further tasks to be addressed below.89 
(b) Arbitration Institutions Acting as Appointing Authority ¾ Under 
both the 1976 and the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, arbitral 
institutions can be agreed upon or be designated as appointing authority.90 
Such a possibility, while not expressly addressed in the Rules’ text, had 
already been foreseen by Pieter Sanders soon after the 1976 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules were adopted. 91  Although most important arbitral 
institutions were at first apparently reluctant to act as appointing 
authority,92 this practice soon became more and more common. Reacting to 
this development, UNCITRAL issued a set of recommendations to assist 
arbitral institutions with regard to arbitrations under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.93 Today, e.g., ICC, the LCIA, the American Arbitration 
																																								 																				
88 GERBAY, supra note 32, at 13. 
89 Infra Section IV.A.3.(a). 
90 BORN, supra note 1, at 1706; CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at 501; Patocchi & Niedermaier, 
supra note 79, ¶ 19; Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 41; Schlaepfer & Petti, supra note 1, at 18; 
WIDDASCHECK, supra note 9, at 30; Willems, supra note 59, at 407. 
91 Sanders, supra note 17, ¶ 2.4. 
92 SCHLOSSER, supra note 14, ¶ 182. 
93 Recommendations to Assist Arbitral Institutions and Other Interested Bodies with Regard to 
Arbitrations Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Adopted at the Fifteenth Session of the 
Commission, 13 YEARBOOK (UNCITRAL) 420 (1982) (on the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
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Association (hereinafter “AAA”), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter “SCC”), the German Institution of 
Arbitration (DIS), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
(hereinafter “HKIAC”), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (hereinafter 
“PCA”) and various other institutions all expressly offer to act as 
appointing authority under the UNCITRAL Rules.94 Some of these arbitral 
institutions have even adopted specific rules governing this task, as e.g. the 
ICC in form of its “Rules of ICC as Appointing Authority in UNCITRAL 
or Other Ad Hoc Arbitration Proceedings” of Jan. 1, 2004,95 the AAA in 
form of its “Procedures for Cases under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” 
as amended and effective on Sept. 15, 2005 or the SCC with its 
“Procedures and Services under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”. 
In a number of jurisdictions, arbitral institutions furthermore not only 
act in this function when parties have so agreed, but are designated as 
appointing authority by law in the local lex arbitri. Such jurisdictions 
mostly did so in implementing Article 6 of the 1985/2006 UNCITRAL 
Model Law, choosing to name a national arbitration institution as 
“authority for certain functions of arbitration assistance and supervision”,96 
instead of State courts that perform such functions in other jurisdictions.97 
Examples are inter alia the arbitration laws of Australia (designating the 
Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration), 98  of Hong 
Kong (designating the HKIAC),99 of Malaysia (designating the Director of 
the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration)100 and of Singapore 
(designating the Chairman of the Singapore (designating the Chairman of 
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre).101 
																																								 																																							 																																							 													
Rules); Note by the Secretariat on Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Recommendations to Assist 
Arbitral Institutions and Other Interested Bodies with Regard to Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, as Revised in 2010, 43 YEARBOOK (UNCITRAL) 251 (2012) (on the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). 
94 See FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN, supra note 4, ¶ 202; LEW ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 3-12. 
95 Jan Heiner Nedden & Axel Benjamin Herzberg, Art.1/Anh.I, II ICC-SchO, in ICC-SCHO/DIS-
SCHO: PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZU DEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSORDNUNGEN, supra note 1, 11, ¶ 10. 
96 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 49, art. 6. 
97 Note that under Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, non-judicial authorities like arbitral 
institutions may only be designated to perform functions in relating to the appointment of 
arbitrators (Article 11 of the Model Law), to challenges of arbitrators (Article 13 of the Model 
Law) and to the termination of their mandate (Article 14 of the Model Law). In contrast, decisions 
on the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal (Article 16(3) of the Model Law) and on applications for 
setting aside the award (Article 34(2) of the Model Law) remain in any case reserved for State 
courts; see HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL 
MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND 
COMMENTARY 239 (1989). 
98 International Arbitration Regulations 2011 (Cth) s 4 (Austl.). 
99 Arbitration Ordinance, (2014) Cap. 609, § 13 (H.K.). 
100 Arbitration Act 2005, sec. 13 (Malay.). 
101 International Arbitration Act 2002, c. 143A, sec. 8 (Sing.). 
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(c) Effect on the Categorization of an Arbitration? ¾ The role of 
arbitral institutions as appointing authority under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, a set of rules originally designed for ad hoc 
arbitrations, 102  begs the question whether their involvement gives such 
UNCITRAL arbitrations a more institutional character than “normal” ad 
hoc arbitrations.  
A number of commentators have indeed argued in favour of such an 
effect on the categorization of UNCITRAL arbitrations, although the 
approaches vary: Some authors regard all UNCITRAL arbitrations as not 
ad hoc arbitrations proper, but rather a “hybrid system”103 or a cross-breed 
lying somewhere between ad hoc arbitration and institutional arbitration,104 
irrespective of the person chosen as appointing authority being a arbitral 
institution or not. For them, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules’ use of an 
appointing authority alone suffices to make UNCITRAL arbitrations 
different from ad hoc arbitrations proper.105 Other authors draw the latter 
conclusion only where an arbitration provides for resort to be had to an 
arbitral institution as appointing authority, rendering (only) such 
arbitrations a “hybrid model”.106 
However, it is submitted that the presence of an appointing authority 
does not deprive an arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 
its character as ad hoc arbitration.107 This is primarily due to the fact that 
the role of an appointing authority is foreseen in most domestic arbitration 
laws today, not the least as a result of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law 
providing for a court or other authority for certain functions of arbitration 
assistance and supervision (Articles 6, 11(3), 11(4), 13(3), 14, 16(3) and 
34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law). If the mere involvement of a third 
party potentially fulfilling the role of an appointing authority would render 
an arbitration a “hybrid” proceeding, this category would encompass the 
vast majority of arbitrations that have traditionally been regarded as ad hoc. 
For the same reason, an arbitral institution acting as appointing authority 
does not make the arbitration “institutional”. This becomes particularly 
obvious when considering that in some jurisdictions, as mentioned 
earlier,108 arbitral institutions have been designated as statutory appointing 
authorities: If this role alone would affect the categorization of arbitrations 
																																								 																				
102 Supra Section II.A.1. 
103 THOMAS WEBSTER, HANDBOOK OF UNCITRAL ARBITRATION ¶¶ 0-51, 6-9 (2010). 
104 Philippe Fouchard, Les Travaux de la C.N.U.D.C.I.: Le Règlement d’arbitrage, JOURNAL DU 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 816, 829 (1979); see also Patocchi & Niedermaier, supra note 79, ¶ 17. 
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proceedings). 
106 WAINCYMER, supra note 26, at ¶ 3.16. 
107 See BORN, supra note 1, at 1706 (“non-institutional arbitration”); Perales Viscasillas, supra 
note 8, at 49 (“still an ad hoc arbitration, and it is not a third type of arbitration”); SCHLOSSER, 
supra note 14, at ¶ 599. 
108 Supra Section IV.A.2.b. 
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concerned, there would be no more ad hoc arbitrations in Australia, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia or Singapore.  
The drafting history of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
supports the position taken here, although its message is admittedly mixed. 
On one hand, the drafters were of the opinion that UNCITRAL arbitrations 
were not institutional arbitrations (as already discussed109), and seemingly 
so in spite of the role they had given to appointing authorities in the 
Rules.110 On the other hand, the rather complicated procedure under the 
1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules for having an arbitrator appointed 
where the parties have not agreed on an appointing authority in their 
contract—with the Secretary General of the PCA at the Hague merely 
designating an appointing authority, but not appointing the arbitrator 
himself111—was explained as “the only solution UNCITRAL could find 
without making its arbitration a fully administered, institutional 
arbitration”.112 The latter remark could be read as an indication that direct 
appointments of arbitrators by the Secretary General of the PCA (or any 
other institution) would have been viewed as making such UNCITRAL 
arbitrations “institutional” in nature—an assessment that would seem at 
least doubtful under today’s arbitration law and practice. 
Finally, case law has similarly found “a clear distinction” between an 
arbitral institution which administers an arbitration and an arbitral 
institution designated as an appointing authority for the purpose of 
appointing the arbitral tribunal.113 
(d) Lessons Learned for the Distinction Between Arbitration 
Categories ¾ The present discussion has confirmed that the involvement 
of an appointing authority in an arbitration does not make the arbitration 
institutional. This is true even if the parties have agreed on an arbitral 
institution to act as appointing authority, and remains true if they have 
furthermore agreed on a pre-existing set of rules (as the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules) to govern the proceeding, as long as these arbitration 
rules are not the institutional rules issued by the arbitral institution 
involved. On a more general level, it can therefore be said that the 
involvement of an appointing authority eventually remains without any 
effect for the categorization of arbitrations. 
3. Arbitration Proceedings According to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules Administered by an Institution ¾ A third and final variation of this 
																																								 																				
109 Supra Section IV.A.1. 
110 See Sanders, supra note 17, at ¶¶ 2.2, 2.4. 
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112 Sanders, supra note 17, at ¶ 6.2. 
113 Subway Systems Australia Pty. Ltd. v Aaron Ireland and Lynette Ireland [2013] VSC 550, ¶ 51 
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discussion has emerged relatively recently. Its source is the expansion of 
administrative tasks that may be allocated to an arbitral institution under 
the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, due to changes introduced into the 
UNCITRAL Rules in their 2010 revision. 
(a) Expansion of the Appointing Authority’s Role Under the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules ¾ As a result of these changes, an arbitral 
institution acting as appointing authority may now be requested, under 
certain circumstances, e.g. to constitute the arbitral tribunal (and in doing 
so, revoke any appointment already made and appoint or reappoint each of 
the arbitrators); to determine whether a party may be deprived of its right to 
appoint a substitute arbitrator and authorize a truncated tribunal to proceed 
and issue an award; and to revise—with binding effect—a tribunal’s 
decision on its fees.114 The expansion of the appointing authority’s role 
under the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules has therefore been described 
as “significant”, not only in regard of the number of tasks assigned to it, but 
also in view of the increased gravity of those tasks.115 
A related scenario arises when parties provide in their arbitration 
agreement for the arbitration to be held in accordance with the 1976 or 
2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but to be “administered” by an 
arbitral institution. 116  It has been held that the administration of an 
arbitration involves more than just acting as an appointing authority117 by 
additionally including some assistance provided by the administering 
institution throughout the arbitral proceeding. While a party agreement on 
an “administered” UNCITRAL arbitration may indeed suggest an 
institutional involvement that extends beyond an appointing authority’s 
role, it remains a matter of interpretation what the desired administration 
includes in a particular case. 
(b) Effect on the Categorization of an Arbitration? ¾ Against this 
background, some commentators have argued that arbitrations under the 
2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules no longer constitute ad hoc 
arbitrations, but rather administered arbitrations with the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules as rules of the arbitration, 118  or that UNCITRAL 
arbitrations now at least “potentially” belong to the institutional arbitration 
																																								 																				
114 Grimmer, supra note 78, at 501, with a detailed discussion of the respective UNCITRAL Rules 
changes at 504-16. 
115 Drymer, supra note 79, at 877; Grimmer, supra note 78, at 502; see also CROFT ET AL., supra 
note 79, at ¶ 6.3; WIDDASCHECK, supra note 9, at 79-80. 
116 See Subway Systems Australia Pty. Ltd. v Aaron Ireland and Lynette Ireland [2013] VSC 550, 
¶ 43 (Austl.) (“The arbitration will be held in accordance with the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Regulations and Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules administered by an 
arbitration association, such as the American Arbitration Association or the Institute of Arbitrators 
or Mediators Australia, at a hearing to be held in Queensland.”). 
117 Id. at ¶ 49; PAUL FRIEDLAND, ARBITRATION CLAUSES FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 37 (2d 
ed. 2007); Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 45. 
118 Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 62 (“[N]ot an ad hoc arbitration”). 
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category.119  Occasionally, the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have 
been characterized as “semi-institutional”.120 Yet other commentators argue 
that the expansion of the appointing authority’s role has led to the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules resembling institutional rules more than the 
1976 UNCITRAL Rules, with UNCITRAL arbitrations nonetheless 
stopping short of being institutional.121 In the related cases of arbitration 
agreements providing an UNCITRAL arbitration ‘administered’ by an 
arbitral institution, it has been held that such an arbitration no longer 
qualifies as ad hoc.122 
However, the more convincing view is that the appointing authorities’ 
expanded role under the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules has not changed the 
character of UNCITRAL arbitrations, which remain non-institutional.123 
This is first of all due to the lack of any indication that the drafters of the 
2010 rules revision intended such a change—on the contrary, it was their 
declared goal to “maintain the original structure and spirit of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”.124 Consistent with this aim, the additional 
tasks assigned to the appointing authority mainly deal with exceptional 
circumstances,125 barring the added power under Article 7(2) to submit a 
case to a sole arbitrator. Arbitral institutions also continue to distinguish 
between the role of an appointing authority under the 2010 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules and the administration of arbitrations under the 
UNCITRAL Rules: For example, the ICC will act as an appointing 
authority, but—unlike some other arbitral institutions—it will not 
administer arbitrations under the UNCITRAL (or other) Rules.126 
It is a different and more complex question whether the possible case 
administration by an arbitral institution foreseen under the 2010 
UNCITRAL Rules may change an arbitration’s character from ad hoc to 
something different, if the administration is sufficiently broad and 
intensive. To this issue we turn next. 
(c) Minimum Degree of Administration Required for Effect on the 
Categorization of an Arbitration? ¾ Some authors indeed regard an 
																																								 																				
119 GERBAY, supra note 32, at 14. 
120 WIDDASCHECK, supra note 9, at 85. 
121 Grimmer, supra note 78, at 516; Drymer, supra note 79, at 877 (the 2010 Rules “institutionalise, 
to a certain degree, UNCITRAL arbitration”). 
122 Subway Systems Australia Pty. Ltd. v Aaron Ireland and Lynette Ireland [2013] VSC 550, ¶ 49 
(Austl.). 
123 See Drymer, supra note 79, at 875-76 (“[T]he UNCITRAL Rules are not institutional rules, and 
UNCITRAL arbitration is not institutional.”). 
124  U.N. Secretary-General, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Revision of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/703 (Mar. 5, 2010); see also U.N. GAOR, 61th Sess., at 
¶ 184, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (July 14, 2006). 
125 Grimmer, supra note 78, at 516. 
126 YVES DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 10 (2d ed. 
2005). 
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UNCITRAL arbitration’s administration by an arbitral institution alone as 
insufficient to render the arbitration “institutional”, but in addition look to 
the amount and type of administrative services offered by the institution. In 
doing so, they require a certain minimum degree of administration as a 
prerequisite for administered UNCITRAL arbitrations no longer being ad 
hoc arbitrations.127 
The question then immediately becomes what degree of administration 
is supposed to change an arbitration’s category from ad hoc to institutional 
or to a third, intermediate category. The answer is difficult because the 
administrative services offered differ significantly between arbitral 
institutions, both in scope and in content. 128  A leading international 
textbook 129  distinguishes between wholly administered and semi-
administered arbitrations: In a wholly administered arbitration, the arbitral 
institution provides a full service to the arbitral tribunal (an example being 
ICSID), while in a semi-administered arbitration the institution collects the 
initial advance on costs from the parties, appoints the arbitral tribunal, and 
then leaves it to the arbitral tribunal to communicate with the parties, 
arrange meetings and hearings, and so forth (an example being arbitrations 
conducted in England under the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators’ 
Rules).130 But this rough distinction is of limited use when it comes to 
capturing the various approaches of arbitral institutions to case 
administration and their effect, if any, on the categorization of arbitrations. 
The following examples are indicative of the uncertainties: 
1. The London Maritime Arbitrators Association (hereinafter “LMAA”) 
only makes default appointments of arbitrators as an appointing 
authority without providing any other services,131 but has nevertheless 
been described as an arbitral “institution”.132 In spite of its institutional 
characterization, arbitration in accordance with the terms of the LMAA 
is mostly considered ad hoc arbitration.133 
2. Similarly, the very limited support offered by the Federation of Oils 
Sees and Fats Associations (hereinafter “FOSFA”) to parties 
conducting arbitration under FOSFA’s arbitration rules supposedly 
falls short of what is conventionally considered as institutional 
																																								 																				
127 GERBAY, supra note 32, at 14; Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 74; see also WIDDASCHECK, supra 
note 9, at 59-60. 
128 SUTTON ET AL., supra note 21, at ¶ 3-052; Schäfer, supra note 14, at ¶ 310; Schlaepfer & Petti, 
supra note 1, at 22; Schütze, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 9-10; Slate, supra note 7, at 47; Timar, supra 
note 5, at 119-20; WIDDASCHECK, supra note 9, at 15; WOLF, supra note 24, at 16-35. 
129 BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 4, at ¶ 1.146 n.157. 
130 Id. 
131 WADE ET AL., supra note 76, at ¶ I-009. 
132 Bertie Vigras, The Role of Institutions in Arbitration, in HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRACTICE 
461 (Ronald Bernstein & Derek Wood et al. eds., 2d ed. 1993). 
133 Bruce Harris, London Maritime Arbitration, reprinted in 77 ARBITRATION 116, 122 (2011); 
GERBAY, supra note 32, at 6. 
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arbitration, 134  although it remains far from clear what that alleged 
conventional standard is. FOSFA arbitration is in general regarded as 
ad hoc,135 which is remarkable given that FOSFA even operates and 
maintains an appeal panel.136 Only occasionally has FOSFA arbitration 
been viewed as “institutionalized”.137 
3. In arbitration according to the long-standing rules of the so-called 
Hamburg friendly arbitration (Hamburger freundschaftliche 
Arbitrage), no administration services are offered, although the 
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce potentially acts as the appointing 
authority. Due to the lack of administration, Hamburg friendly 
arbitration is predominantly categorized as ad hoc arbitration. 138  In 
contrast, the German Federal Supreme Court qualified the Hamburger 
freundschaftliche Arbitrage as a permanent arbitral institution (and 
thereby the related arbitrations supposedly as institutional139), although 
the degree of administration played no role in this context; instead, the 
court regarded the use of the institution’s own arbitration rules as the 
decisive point.140 
4. Among the major international arbitral institutions, the LCIA is often 
characterized by its supposed “light touch” approach to case 
administration,141 although its administrative involvement appears less 
light when compared with that of the LMAA, the FOSFA or the 
Hamburg friendly arbitration. When instead the ICC is used as 
comparative standard, LCIA arbitration may well be described as “less 
‘institutionalized’ and interventionist”, 142  or even as occupying an 
																																								 																				
134 GERBAY, supra note 32, at 7. 
135 Id. at 7; ROBERT MERKIN, ARBITRATION LAW 36 (3d ed. 2004). 
136 See Brian Chapman, FOSFA International Arbitration, 2(4) ARB. INT’L 323, 330-31(1986). 
137 Jacques Covo, Commodities, Arbitrations and Equitable Considerations, 9(1) ARB. INT’L 57, 60 
(1993). 
138 Mike Oliver Korte, Die Hamburger Freundschaftliche Arbitrage – Ein Überblick Anlässlich des 
100-jährigen Jubiläums des § 20 Platzusancen für den Hamburgischen Warenhandel, in 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHIEDSVERFAHREN 240, 241 (2004); ROLF A. SCHÜTZE ET AL., HANDBUCH DES 
SCHIEDSVERFAHRENS ¶ 792 (2d ed. 1990); Karl Heinz Schwab & Gerhard Walter, 
Kapitel 41. Grundlagen des Internationalen Schiedsverfahrens, in SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT ¶ 16 
(7th ed. 2005); Hanspeter Vogel, Institutionalisierte Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit, in RECHT UND 
JURISTEN IN HAMBURG 22 (1994). 
139  In this sense, Karl Heinz Schwab & Gerhard Walter, Kapitel 41. Grundlagen des 
Internationalen Schiedsverfahrens, in SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT ¶ 16 (Schwab & Walter et al. 
eds., 2000). 
140  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 2, 1982, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1268, 1983 (Ger.). 
141  Adrian Winstanley, Review of the London Court of International Arbitration, in 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE: 21ST CENTURY PERSPECTIVES 3 (Horacio 
Grigera Naón ed., 2010). For a sceptical view of this assessment see SCHERER ET AL., supra 
note 76, at 24.  
142 Lew et al., supra note 32, at ¶  18.20; see also SUTTON ET AL., supra note 21, at ¶ 3-053; in 
more detail Sabine Konrad & Robert Hunter, LCIA Rules, in INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION, supra 
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historical position “halfway between full institutional arbitration and 
ad hoc forms of arbitration”. 143  In any case and in spite of their 
divergent administrative styles, both ICC and LCIA arbitration are 
generally regarded as institutional.144 
These examples—and various others could be mentioned—
demonstrate the difficulty of classifying existing approaches to case 
administration, and how subjective (and sometimes random) 
categorizations derived from such classifications can be. A related issue is 
the difficulty of defining the degree of administration that marks the line 
between ad hoc and institutional arbitration in a clear and workable 
manner, given the need for foreseeable criteria and the variety of 
administrative services offered by different institutions. Some basic 
assumptions are intuitively convincing, as e.g., simple administrative 
services not being sufficient to render an arbitration “institutional”, because 
mere office centres would otherwise qualify as arbitral institutions.145 But 
beyond this point, both generally acceptable and workable criteria are 
almost impossible to define. For example, suggested distinctions like the 
one between partial administrative services (resulting in ad hoc 
arbitration) 146  and a fully administered arbitration under the 2010 
UNCITRAL Rules (being an institutional arbitration)147 leave practitioners 
with significant uncertainty, given the differences between the “full” 
services as offered by different arbitral institutions.  
In essence, the lack of agreed criteria therefore render the “degree” of 
case administration an unconvincing guidepost for the delimitation of 
arbitration categories. Against this background, it is submitted that neither 
the use of administrative services as such 148  nor the breadth of such 
administration should be decisive in this respect. Accordingly, arbitrations 
under the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules may on occasion be 
“administered” ad hoc arbitrations, but are ad hoc arbitrations 
nonetheless.149 
(d) Lessons Learned for the Distinction Between Arbitration 
Categories ¾ The present discussion has shown that the additional tasks 
carried out by an appointing authority under the 2010 UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules do not turn UNCITRAL arbitrations into institutional 
																																								 																																							 																																							 													
note 9, 413, ¶¶ 67-73. But see MCILWRATH & SAVAGE, supra note 1, at ¶ 1-100, who argue that in 
practical terms, the LCIA does not differ substantially from the ICC in many respects. 
143 V.V. Veeder, The New 1998 LCIA Rules, in YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1998: 
VOLUME XXIII 366, 366 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1998). 
144 Lalive, supra note 1, at 665; SUTTON ET AL., supra note 21, at ¶  3-053 (on both ICC and LCIA 
arbitration); WADE ET AL., supra note 76, at ¶ I-009 (on LCIA arbitration). 
145 Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 46. 
146 Id. at 74. 
147 Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 72. 
148 Lalive, supra note 1, at 665; Zhou, supra note 59, at 146. 
149 Willems, supra note 59, at 408-09. 
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arbitrations.150 The same is true for the administration of an arbitration by 
an arbitral institution where the institution does not act under its own 
institutional rules, but based on a clause in the arbitration agreement.151 The 
underlying ratio in both constellations is that the degree of institutional 
administrative services provided is too vague and uncertain a criterion to 
distinguish between arbitration categories, given that the services offered 
vary so much from institution to institution. 
B. Parties’ Choice of Institutional Rules, but Not of the Issuing 
Institution (and Vice Versa) 
The textbook definitions of the term “institutional arbitration” 
presented earlier 152  demonstrated that almost every definition attempt 
combines two components, namely the arbitral institution and arbitration 
rules issued by that institution. What effect, if any, does it then have for an 
arbitration’s categorization if the parties have only chosen one of these two 
components in their arbitration agreement?  
1. Choice of Institutional Rules Only ¾ Cases in which arbitration 
agreements refer only to an institution’s arbitration rules are particularly 
frequent, not the least because the standard arbitration clauses of most 
institutions only speak of the respective rules, but not of the issuing 
institution itself. Examples are the LCIA’s recommended clause (“Any 
dispute . . . shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under the 
LCIA Rules, . . . .”) or the Standard ICC Arbitration Clause (“All disputes . 
. . shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce . . . .”), among many others. In order to avoid any 
uncertainty about the role of the rules-issuing institution in these cases, 
some institutional rules expressly provide that a choice of the rules is 
deemed to be also a choice of the institution. For example, Article 6(2) of 
the 2017 ICC Rules states that “[b]y agreeing to arbitration under the 
Rules, the parties have accepted that the arbitration shall be administered 
by the [ICC] Court.” But the same result could arguably be reached without 
an explicit provision through a reasonable construction of the arbitration 
agreement. 153  An interpretation of such arbitration agreements thereby 
																																								 																				
150 Supra Section IV.A.3.b. 
151 Supra Section IV.A.3.(c). 
152 Supra Section II.B. 
153 Insigma v. Alstom, supra note 2, ¶ 33; York Research Corp. v. Landgarten, 927 F.2d 119, 123 
(2d Cir. 1991) (arbitration clause that any dispute “shall be determined and settled by binding 
arbitration in New York pursuant to [the AAA’s rules]” is an agreement that “the AAA should 
administer the arbitration process and apply its Commercial Arbitration Rules”); Prostyakov v. 
Masco Corp., 513 F.3d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 2008) (parties “did, in fact, submit to AAA participation 
by agreeing that the arbitration would be governed by AAA rules”); Zhou, supra note 59, at 145. A 
different conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of New York in Nachmani v. By Design, 
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usually guarantees that both traditional components of an institutional 
arbitration are present.  
The situation can be more difficult where legal provisions impose 
particular requirements on the choice of an arbitral institution in arbitration 
agreements. The most prominent example is Article 16(2) of the 
Arbitration Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China and its mention of “[t]he 
arbitration commission chosen” as a necessary content of any valid 
arbitration clause.154 Not surprisingly, the model clause used by the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) 
therefore explicitly refers to both the institution and its rules (“Any dispute 
arising from or in connection with this Contract shall be submitted to China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for arbitration 
which shall be conducted in accordance with the Commission’s arbitration 
rules . . . .”). And for parties wishing to have an ICC Arbitration in 
Mainland China, the ICC has supplemented its standard arbitration clause 
for this purpose, recommending to also include an explicit reference to the 
institution (“All disputes . . . shall be submitted to the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce and shall be finally 
settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce . . . .”). In case an arbitration agreement refers exclusively to 
institutional arbitration rules, the PRC’s Supreme People’s Court has 
described its effect under the Chinese lex arbitri as follows:  
 
Where the arbitration agreement only agrees upon the applicable 
arbitration rules, it shall be deemed that no arbitration institution 
has been agreed upon, except where the parties concerned have 
reached a supplementary agreement, or where the arbitration 
institution can be determined according to the arbitration rules 
that have been agreed on.155  
 
The latter caveat—“except where . . . the arbitration institution can be 
determined according to the arbitration rules that have been agreed on”—
was one of the reasons for the introduction of Article 6(2) of the 2012 and 
2017 ICC Rules, the provision mentioned earlier.156 
																																								 																																							 																																							 													
arbitration “in accordance with AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules’ was interpreted as only a 
‘choice of law . . . clause’ and not an agreement that the arbitration be administered by the AAA”; 
see the critical remarks in BORN, supra note 1, at 833 (“That conclusion, and its reasoning, is 
plainly wrong”.). 
154 Supra Section III.C.2.(b). 
155 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Kuanyu Shihyung Zhunghua Renmin Guongheguo Chungtsaifa Jogan 
Wenti de Chiehhsieh [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court concerning Some Issues on 
Application of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China] art. 4 (Ch.). 
156 JASON FRY ET AL., THE SECRETARIAT’S GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION ¶ 3-4 (2012). 
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Nevertheless, certain cases remain in which an arbitration agreement 
referring only to institutional rules cannot be interpreted as also selecting 
the issuing institution. One example are cases in which the parties have 
explicitly agreed on their arbitration to be conducted ad hoc, but under 
institutional rules157—a rare case, and an approach that has rightfully been 
discouraged. 158  Another example are cases in which the arbitration 
agreement calls for the arbitrator to be appointed by one institution and 
provides that this arbitrator must then conduct the proceedings in 
accordance with the rules of another institution. 159  In neither of such 
situations, the mere agreement on institutional arbitration rules affect the 
arbitration’s ad hoc nature,160 indicating that the use of institutional rules 
alone does not make an arbitration “institutional”. 
2. Choice of Institution Only ¾ The reverse constellation—party 
agreements that refer only to an arbitral institution, but not to its rules—
similarly raises the question which category the resulting arbitration 
belongs to. Some standard arbitration clauses are framed in this way, as for 
example the clause recommended by the Court of Arbitration of the 
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce (“Any dispute . . . shall be finally settled 
by the Court of Arbitration of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce . . . .”). 
Similar to what was described a moment ago, 161  a reasonable 
construction of such “institution only” clauses will usually reveal that the 
parties intended the arbitral rules of that institution to apply. 162 
Article IV(1)(a) of the 1961 Geneva Convention even contains a legal 
assumption to his end. After confirming under the heading “Organization 
of the arbitration” that the parties to an arbitration agreement are free to 
submit their disputes to a permanent arbitral institution, Article IV(1)(a) 
provides that “in this case, the arbitration proceedings shall be held in 
conformity with the rules of the said institution”. Whenever either the 
interpretation of the arbitration clause or the application of Article IV(1)(a) 
of the 1961 Geneva Convention thus supplements an “institution only” 
clause by adding the institution’s rules of arbitration, the arbitration will be 
																																								 																				
157 TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 6, at ¶ 3.02; Heiko A. Haller, § 24 DIS-SchO, in ICC-
SCHO/DIS-SCHO: PRAXISKOMMENTAR ZU DEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSORDNUNGEN, supra note 1, 806, 
¶ 24. 
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institutional in nature, at least according to the traditional definitions163 
outlined earlier. 
However, there remain cases in which neither the arbitration 
agreement’s reasonable construction nor a legal presumption will result in 
the applicability of the selected institution’s arbitration rules, thereby 
leaving the arbitral institution as the sole institutional aspect agreed upon. 
This is necessarily so where no such institutional rules exist: While a good 
number of arbitral institutions (in particular the well-known international 
institutions) have their own arbitration rules, a great deal more do not.164 
Another constellation are party agreements that designate arbitral 
institutions as appointing authorities or as case administrators under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 165  In such cases, the arbitration is not 
institutional in spite of the parties’ (isolated) choice of an institution, but 
rather ad hoc.166 
3. Lessons Learned for the Distinction Between Arbitration Categories 
¾ Legal practice with regard to arbitration agreements choosing only an 
arbitral institution (without the institution’s in-house arbitration rules) or 
only institutional arbitration rules (without the issuing institution’s 
administration) shows a strong tendency to construe such clauses as also 
selecting the missing component, either by relying on express legal rules in 
this respect or on general rules of interpretation. Whenever such a 
constructive approach succeeds, the arbitration concerned qualifies as 
institutional. In the remaining cases, the involvement of only an arbitral 
institution or only institutional arbitration rules usually means that the 
arbitration is regarded as ad hoc. Borderline cases of this type thereby 
demonstrate that both components are required for an arbitration to be 
“institutional”: In addition to the use of institutional rules, at least some 
involvement of the arbitral institution beyond having drafted the respective 
rules is needed. 
C. Modification of Institutional Rules by the Parties 
The third type of borderline cases concerns the modification of 
institutional arbitration rules by the parties to an arbitration, or—maybe 
more to the point—the limits of such modifications. It is generally 
recognized that party autonomy also reigns supreme in institutional 
arbitration,167 allowing the parties to modify institutional arbitration rules to 
meet the needs of their particular transaction. Some institutional rules 
																																								 																				
163 Supra Section II.B. 
164 GERBAY, supra note 32, at 13. 
165 Supra Section IV.A.2., 3. 
166 Zhou, supra note 59, at 146. 
167 See supra note 76.  
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contain express provisions to this end. 168  At the same time, there is 
widespread agreement that party autonomy in institutional arbitration is not 
unlimited,169 but in fact more limited than in ad hoc arbitration: While ad 
hoc and institutional arbitrations alike have to respect the mandatory 
provisions of the lex arbitri,170 institutional arbitration rules may contain 
further provisions from which the parties cannot derogate.171 Article 7(6) of 
the 2013 Vienna Rules172 explicitly provides that the International Arbitral 
Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (VIAC) can refuse to 
administer proceedings if the arbitration agreement “deviates 
fundamentally from and is incompatible with” the Vienna Rules. However, 
already under the Vienna Rules’ previous version that still indiscriminately 
referred to any agreement “deviating from” the institutional rules, 
commentators agreed that a refusal to administrate was only justified in 
very narrow circumstances 173  where the parties attempt to modify 
provisions from which they are not allowed to derogate.174  
1. Non-Derogatable (“Mandatory”) Provisions in Institutional 
Arbitration Rules ¾ Provisions in institutional rules from which the parties 
may not derogate are often referred to as “mandatory” arbitration rules,175 
although this term is arguably misleading: 176  Given that institutional 
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109-15.  
175 See Böckstiegel, supra note 5, at 2; Sébastien Besson, Introduction to the Swiss Rules, in SWISS 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY ¶ 30 (Tobias Zuberbühler et al. ed., 
2005); Geisinger, supra note 169, at 78; SCHERER ET AL., supra note 76, at 36; Smit, supra 
note 169, at 845; THOMAS H. WEBSTER & MICHAEL W. BÜHLER, HANDBOOK OF ICC 
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arbitration rules apply by the parties` choice and not by law, any provisions 
in arbitration rules chosen are no more mandatory than contractual clauses 
purporting to derogate from them. In other words, the conflict is not 
between the will of the parties and the law, but between two different 
expressions of the parties’ will.177 As a result, an arbitration agreement 
attempting to derogate from a non-derogatable (or non-amendable 178 ) 
institutional arbitration rule is not (or not necessarily) invalid.179 However, 
it gives the arbitration institution the right to refuse the arbitration’s 
administration if the parties do not accept the unfettered application of the 
institutional rules’ non-derogatable provisions.180 
For the purposes of the present article, cases involving a modification 
of institutional arbitration rules are of interest as a “borderline case” 
because they attempt to combine a crucial characteristic of institutional 
arbitration – the proceedings’ administration by an institutional body – with 
a distinguishing feature of ad hoc arbitration—the parties’ freedom to tailor 
their arbitration’s procedure to their specific needs. When regarded in this 
manner, non-derogatable (or “mandatory”) provisions of institutional 
arbitration rules could be expected to reflect the core characteristics of 
institutional arbitration, the very features that parties cannot dispense with 
without losing the institutional character of their arbitration. 
Do the limits of party autonomy unique to institutional arbitration 
therefore show us what makes institutional arbitration “institutional”? 
2. Examples of Non-Derogatable Institutional Rules ¾ In order to 
answer this question, we must first identify the provisions in institutional 
arbitration rules that parties may not derogate from. Insofar, we are not 
concerned with those non-derogatable provisions in institutional rules that 
merely mirror mandatory rules of the lex arbitri (or, more rarely, of other 
legal orders), as notably provisions imposing a duty on arbitrators to remain 
impartial and independent of the parties or guaranteeing the parties’ equal 
treatment and their right to be heard.181 Given that such standards already 
flow from the mandatory standards of most leges arbitri, the content of 
such institutional provisions do not reflect what is unique to institutional 
arbitration. Beyond this, arbitration experts generally admit that the non-
derogatable, institution-specific core of institutional rules is far from 
																																								 																				
177 Carlevaris, supra note 76, at 114. 
178 This term is used by Nicholls & Bloch, supra note 170, at 404-05.  
179  Besson, supra note 175, ¶ 37; Nicholls & Bloch, supra note 170, at 404-05; see also 
CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at 617. 
180 Carlevaris, supra note 76, at 115; LAURENCE W. CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 295 (2000); Geisinger, supra note 169, at 77; Andreas Reiner & 
Christian Aschauer, ICC Rules, in INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, 38, ¶ 27; 
SCHWARTZ & DERAINS, supra note 126, at 7-8; Smit, supra note 169, at 847; VERBIST ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 16; WEBSTER & BÜHLER, supra note 175, ¶ 1-29. 
181 See in more detail the overview in BORN, supra note 1, at 2163-84. 
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clear. 182  To make matters worse, this core differs from institution to 
institution. 
In case of the ICC Rules, “mandatory” features identified by 
commentators are the fixing of arbitrators’ fees and expenses by the ICC 
Court183 (Article 2(4) of Appendix III to the 2017 ICC Rules expressly 
saying so); the appointment and confirmation of arbitrators in ICC 
arbitrations184 (Articles 12(8) and 13 of the 2012 ICC Rules); the ICC’s 
court role in screening requests for arbitration and jurisdictional objections 
as well as deciding on its own competence to administer a case185 (Articles 
6(3) and (4) of the 2017 ICC Rules); the uneven number of arbitrators on 
the tribunal (Articles 12(1) of the 2012 ICC Rules), unless the parties have 
agreed on a procedure to resolve a possible deadlock; 186  the majority 
requirement for awards made by a three-member tribunal187 (Article 32(1) 
of the 2017 ICC Rules); and the scrutiny of draft awards by the ICC 
Court188 (Article 34 of the 2017 ICC Rules).189 The Terms of Reference 
procedure (Article 23 of the 2017 ICC Rules) has also often been named,190 
although commentators have more recently started to doubt its non-
derogatable nature.191 The latter position has received support by the 2017 
ICC Rules now dispensing with the Terms of Reference whenever an 
arbitration is conducted under the new Expedited Procedure Rules 
(Article 3(1) of Appendix VI to the 2017 ICC Rules).  
																																								 																				
182  With regard to the ICC Rules see Richard H. Kreindler, Impending Revision of the ICC 
Arbitration Rules: Opportunities and Hazards for Experienced and Inexperienced Users Alike, 
13(2) J. INT’L ARB. 45, 56 (1996); SCHWARTZ & DERAINS, supra note 126, at 8; with regard to the 
LCIA Rules see SCHERER ET AL., supra note 76, at 37; with regard to the Swiss Rules see Besson, 
supra note 175, at ¶ 30. 
183 Carlevaris, supra note 76, at 116; FRY ET AL., supra note 156, ¶ 3-17; VERBIST ET AL., supra 
note 15, at 16; WEBSTER & BÜHLER, supra note 175, ¶ 1-30; but see Smit, supra note 169, at 867-
68. 
184 Carlevaris, supra note 76, at 123-24; Reiner & Aschauer, supra note 180, at ¶ 27; Smit, supra 
note 169, at 858, 860. 
185 Carlevaris, supra note 76, at 120; Smit, supra note 169, at 853-54. 
186 Reiner & Aschauer, supra note 180, ¶ 27. 
187 Smit, supra note 169, at 863. 
188 Carlevaris, supra note 76, at 119; CRAIG ET AL., supra note 180, at 295; CROFT ET AL., supra 
note 79, ¶ 1.1; FRY ET AL., supra note 156, ¶ 3-17; MARTIN F. GUSY ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE ICDR 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES ¶ 1.92 (2011); Reiner & Aschauer, supra note 180, at ¶ 27; 
Schäfer, supra note 14, ¶ 314; Smit, supra note 169, at 865; VERBIST ET AL., supra note 15, at 16; 
WEBSTER & BÜHLER, supra note 175, ¶ 1-30. 
189 Further‚ mandatory provisions are Article 1(2) of the 2017 ICC Rules dealing with “mix and 
match” arbitrations (to be discussed in detail infra at IV.D.), and Article 6(2) of the 2017 ICC 
Rules (already addressed supra at IV.B.1.). 
190 FRY ET AL., supra note 156, at ¶ 3-17; GUSY ET AL., supra note 188, at ¶ 1.92; SCHWARTZ & 
DERAINS, supra note 126, at 5-6; VERBIST ET AL., supra note 15, at 16; WEBSTER & BÜHLER, 
supra note 175, ¶ 1-30. 
191 Smit, supra note 169, at 862-63; Carlevaris, supra note 76, at 120-21. 
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Under the LCIA Rules, the LCIA Court’s power to appoint the arbitral 
tribunal (Article 5.7 of the 2014 LCIA Rules),192 its power to decide on the 
arbitration costs (Article 28.1 of the 2014 LCIA Rules) as well as the 
LCIA’s Schedule of Costs in general have been identified as non-
derogatable.193 
In case of the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, non-derogatable 
provisions concern the confirmation of arbitrators by the Swiss Chambers 
(Article 5(1) of the 2004 Swiss Rules), the challenge and revocation of the 
appointment of arbitrators by the Special Committee (Articles 11 and 12 of 
the 2004 Swiss Rules), and provisions protecting the interest of the Swiss 
Chambers, like the rules on the scrutiny of awards on the issue of costs 
(Article 40(4) of the 2004 Swiss Rules and Appendix B about the costs of 
the proceedings, at least to the extent that the registration fee and the 
Chambers’ administrative costs are concerned) or the exclusion of the 
Chambers’ liability (Article 44 of the 2004 Swiss Rules).194 The matter is 
viewed as less clear for the arbitral tribunal’s duty to prepare a provisional 
timetable (Article 15(3) of the 2004 Swiss Rules)195 and for the rules about 
the expedited procedure (Article 42(2) of the 2004 Swiss Rules).196 
Under the DIS Arbitration Rules, the provisions on the confirmation of 
arbitrators by the institution (§ 17 of the 1998 DIS Arbitration Rules),197 on 
the termination of arbitral proceedings by the tribunal (§ 32 and § 39 of the 
1998 DIS Arbitration Rules), 198  on administrative fees and on the 
provisional advance on costs (§ 7, §§ 11(1), (2), § 25 and § 40 of the 1998 
DIS Arbitration Rules)199 are regarded as non-derogatable. 
																																								 																				
192 SCHERER ET AL., supra note 76, at 36-37; see also WADE, CLIFFORD & CLANCY, supra note 76, 
¶ 5-044. 
193 SCHERER ET AL., supra note 76, at 36-37; see generally Adrian Winstanley, Party Autonomy and 
Institutional Rules, in 8TH BIENNIAL IFCAI CONFERENCE (2005). 
194 Besson, supra note 175, at ¶ 32. For a more flexible view, see Geisinger, supra note 169, at 78. 
195 See Besson, supra note 175, at ¶ 32 (“possibly”); Tina Wüstemann & Cesare Jermini, Article 15, 
in SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY, supra note 175 ¶ 6 
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SCHIEDSGERICHTSORDNUNGEN, supra note 1, ¶ 15; Simon Manner, § 11 DIS-SchO, in ICC-
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In contrast, the generously-drafted Article 1(1) of the 2014 ICDR 
(AAA) International Arbitration Rules (“subject to whatever modifications 
the parties may adopt in writing”) seems to grant absolute precedence to 
party autonomy.200 
3. Non-Derogatable Institutional Rules as “Core” of Institutional 
Arbitration? ¾ The overview of the non-derogatable provisions contained 
in the institutional rules of a few selected arbitral institutions has most of 
all made apparent that these “mandatory” institutional rules are far from 
uniform, rendering it difficult to regard them as an indication of the core of 
institutional arbitration in a general sense. Instead of reflecting the 
characteristic features of institutional arbitration that are not present in ad 
hoc arbitration, they rather reflect cornerstones of a particular institution’s 
arbitration. 201  The latter becomes notably apparent when taking into 
account the many institutional arbitration rules that have been closely 
modelled on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules202 (including the changes 
introduced by their 2010 revision203), with some institutional rules being 
virtual copies of the UNCITRAL Rules: As any “mandatory” core of such 
institutional rules would necessarily resemble the non-derogatable 
provisions of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, this core can by definition 
not be characteristic for institutional arbitration only, because it is similarly 
present in UNCITRAL (and therefore, as addressed earlier, 204  ad hoc) 
arbitrations. 
In other words, it is not the content of non-derogatable institutional 
arbitration rules that can inform us about the nature of institutional 
arbitration. As will be demonstrated below, the “mandatory” core of 
institutional rules nevertheless provides us with important input about the 
borders of institutional arbitration, albeit for a different reason. 
4. Case Law on Attempted Party-Derogations from Non-Derogatable 
Institutional Rules ¾ The effects of party attempts to derogate from 
“mandatory” institutional arbitration rules became apparent in Samsung 
Electronics v. Qimonda, a case decided by the Tribunal de Grande Instance 
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de Paris in 2010.205 It arose from a license contract in which the parties had 
agreed to have any dispute decided by ICC arbitration, but without the 
arbitrators’ appointment having to be confirmed by the ICC Court or the 
arbitral award undergoing scrutiny by the ICC Court. Their arbitration 
agreement accordingly derogated from not only one, but two features of the 
ICC Rules that are commonly viewed as non-derogatable,206 attempting to 
exclude the arguably most invasive powers of the ICC.207 Because of those 
derogations, the ICC Secretariat refused to administer the arbitration208 and, 
when the defendant did not agree to remove those derogations, declared the 
arbitration proceedings terminated. 209  In light of this development, the 
parties agreed to conduct an ad hoc arbitration, with the two already party-
appointed arbitrators and with the ICC as appointing authority, should one 
be needed in order to appoint the presiding arbitrator.210 
The decision in Samsung Electronics provides two important insights 
into the factors determining the nature of an arbitration as institutional or 
ad hoc. The first insight is the confirmation of an arbitral institution’s 
power (here: the power of the ICC) to decide whether an arbitration can go 
forward where the parties have attempted to derogate from provisions in 
the institution’s rules that the institution considers to be non-derogatable. 
Although the parties to the arbitration have agreed upon the derogations 
from the institutional rules as much as upon the institutional rules’ 
application to their arbitration, the institution possesses the right to 
determine the institutional nature of the arbitration: If it decides (one may 
add: in accordance with its institutional rules) that an arbitration cannot 
continue, the proceedings are no longer institutional. In institutional 
arbitration, the arbitral institution therefore exercises what may be called a 
“gatekeeper function”.  
The second insight from the Samsung Electronics case concerns an 
arbitration’s nature once the “gatekeeping” institution has exercised its 
gatekeeper function to a negative end, deciding that the arbitration cannot 
continue under its administration as an institutional arbitration. In Samsung, 
the parties had seemingly agreed under the court’s guidance (with the court 
acting as juge d’appui in accordance with the French law of arbitration) to 
continue the proceedings that commenced as an institutional arbitration as 
an ad hoc arbitration. The institutional arbitration thereby “mutated” into 
																																								 																				
205 Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Jan. 22, 2010, 
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206 Supra Section IV.C.2. 
207 Racine, supra note 24, at 578. 
208 Samsung v. Qimonda AG, supra note 205, at 574-75. 
209 Id. at 575. 
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an ad hoc arbitration.211 But even if no such subsequent agreement would 
have been reached between the parties, the result would arguably have been 
the same: Irrespective of the applicable lex arbitri (i.e., also where the 
applicable arbitration law is that of a jurisdiction other than France), an 
interpretation of the arbitration agreement would lead to the conclusion that 
the parties intended to continue their proceedings even if the institution 
named refuses its administration, although it would then be an ad hoc 
arbitration 212  (and neither an institutional nor a third category of 
arbitration). 
5. Institution’s Gatekeeper Function as Decisive Characteristic of 
Institutional Arbitration ¾ The case law on attempted derogations from 
non-derogatable institutional rules provides a crucial guidepost in defining 
institutional arbitration: It is submitted that it is an arbitral institution’s 
power, given to the institution through the parties’ agreement on its 
institutional arbitration rules, to unilaterally preserve the core 
characteristics of its arbitration procedure (as, in Samsung Electronics, the 
ICC’s confirmation of arbitrator appointments and its scrutiny of arbitral 
awards) what makes an institutional arbitration “institutional”. The 
authority of an institution to protect the core characteristics of its 
institutional arbitration, its final decision about desired derogations from its 
rules, constitutes a decisive third-party involvement well-suited to 
distinguish institutional from other arbitrations. The focus on this 
“gatekeeper function” avoids the uncertainties inherent in both a reliance 
on the characteristic “core” of institutional arbitration rules 213  and in 
attempts to define arbitral institutions, because it is unclear what factors 
make an institution an arbitral institution.214 Instead, the present approach 
looks to the institution’s decision-making power in relation to the parties to 
an arbitration. 
A gatekeeper function as described here is particular to certain arbitral 
institutions. On the one hand, it distinguishes them from mere appointing 
authorities, because and as far as the parties cannot overrule the arbitral 
institution’s decision and nevertheless preserve the institutional nature of 
their arbitration. An institution’s decision-making power of this kind 
exceeds an appointing authority’s power to appoint arbitrators under 
domestic laws because the latter appointments are not binding on both 
parties, who in spite of it could agree on different arbitrators. (To be clear, 
																																								 																				
211 Racine, supra note 24, at 576; see generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 4, at 11 (“Too great an 
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& Bloch, supra note 170, at 405. 
213 Supra Section IV.C.3. 
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the power to make decisions that are binding on only one party is 
insufficient in this regard, as such a power is typical for appointing 
authorities in ad hoc and institutional arbitrations alike.215) On the other 
hand, a gatekeeper function is not necessarily exercised by every arbitral 
institution (however defined), because the required decision-making power 
must be delegated to the institution through the institutional rules. The 
presence of a gatekeeper function therefore depends on the role given to the 
respective institution by its rules, which means that not every arbitral 
institution conducts “institutional” arbitrations in the sense proposed here.  
The present approach does not presuppose any specific content of the 
rules that an arbitral institution is entitled to preserve. It thereby 
accomodates the procedural differences between the various arbitral 
institutions, including the differences in the non-derogatable part of their 
respective arbitration rules that was outlined earlier.216  
Where it is present, the gatekeeper function implements an additional 
limit to the parties’ autonomy not existent in ad hoc arbitration. In case an 
arbitral institution vested with the necessary decision-making power denies 
its consent to have an arbitration move forward under its rules, such an 
arbitration no longer qualifies as “institutional”, even if it nevertheless 
should be continued by the parties. 
6. Lessons Learned for the Distinction Between Arbitration Categories 
¾ If an arbitration institution named in an arbitration agreement refuses to 
administer the arbitration because the parties have derogated from 
provisions in the institutional arbitration rules that the institution considers 
non-derogatable, the arbitration cannot proceed as an institutional 
arbitration.217 If the parties and the arbitral tribunal proceed nonetheless in 
such a situation, the arbitration continues as an ad hoc arbitration.218 This 
indicates that an arbitral institution’s power to unilaterally preserve the core 
characteristics of its institutional arbitration procedure is what makes an 
institutional arbitration “institutional”.219  Where this gatekeeper function 
has resulted in the institution not allowing an arbitration to proceed under 
its auspices, this decision cannot prevent the parties from nevertheless 
using the institutional arbitration rules—however, such a proceeding would 
then be an ad hoc arbitration.220 
In contrast, the content of the non-derogatable provisions of 
institutional arbitration rules does not seem to reflect a universal core of 
institutional arbitrations, but rather demonstrates the significant variety of 
																																								 																				
215 See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 49, arts. 11(3)-(5) and further infra Section V.B.2.(a). 
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219 Supra Section IV.C.5. 
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arbitral proceedings and of the procedural involvement of different 
institutions.221 
D. “Mix and Match” (or “Hybrid”) Arbitrations 
The fourth and last group of borderline cases are so-called “mix and 
match” arbitrations, often also referred to as “hybrid”222 arbitrations. 
1. Characteristics of “Mix and Match” Arbitrations ¾ In such cases, 
that—luckily—are rare, the parties agree to conduct their arbitration under 
the rules of one arbitral institution, but to have it administered by another 
arbitral institution. In doing so, they therefore “mix and match” institutional 
rules and administering institution. In a manner of speaking, such 
arbitration agreements constitute a sub-type of the borderline cases just 
discussed223 that involve the modification of institutional arbitration rules 
by the parties. They are nevertheless particular because they take the 
modifications to the extreme, by exchanging the entire arbitral institution 
that has designed the applicable rules for a different administering 
institution. 
The first case to put “mix and match” arbitrations into the spotlight was 
the famous (or rather infamous) case Insigma Technology Co. Ltd. v. 
Alstom Technology Ltd.,224 decided by the Singapore High Court in 2008. It 
involved an arbitration clause that called for “arbitration before the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre in accordance with the Rules of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce”.225 Similar cases 
that have resulted in published court decisions concerned agreements about 
arbitrations to be conducted pursuant to the ICC Rules, but to be 
administered by the AAA;226 another one to be conducted pursuant to the 
ICC Rules, but to be administered by the SCC;227 and—again—disputes to 
“be referred to Singapore International Arbitration Center (hereinafter 
“SIAC”) for arbitration in accordance with the Rules of Conciliation and 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.”228 Practitioners 
																																								 																				
221 Supra Section IV.C.3. 
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assume more cases to have occurred229 that have remained confidential, 
because none of the parties involved has resorted to court proceedings.  
2. Potential Insight into the Factors that Make Arbitrations 
Institutional ¾ For the discussion about arbitration categories, “mix and 
match” arbitrations are of interest because they aim at a separation of the 
two components traditionally considered characteristic for institutional 
arbitrations,230 namely an institution’s arbitration rules and an institution’s 
administration of the proceedings. While, as a rule, arbitral institutions 
administer proceedings in accordance with their own (“in-house”) rules, 
‘mix and match’ arbitrations constitute an exception. Can their unusual 
disconnection of rules and administration provide us with additional insight 
into the nature of institutional arbitration? 
3. Case Law on “Mix and Match” Arbitrations ¾ As “mix and match” 
arbitrations involve not only one, but two arbitral institutions (albeit in a 
particular way), one could be tempted to think that such arbitrations must a 
fortiori qualify as institutional arbitrations.231 Other commentators regard 
hybrid arbitrations as neither institutional nor ad hoc arbitrations, but rather 
a third category.232  
(a) Insigma Technology v. Alstom Technology ¾ In Insigma, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal adopted a yet different position. In affirming the 
High Court’s views in this regard, it held as follows: 
 
The arrangement provided for in [the Arbitration Agreement] 
would be unworkable if the SIAC was unable to provide 
similarly equipped actors to fulfil the roles that the ICC Rules 
gave to the institutional bodies of the ICC. However, while it 
might not be advisable to use the ICC Rules for most ad hoc 
arbitrations because of the need for an administering body, if the 
ad hoc arbitration nominates a substitute institution to administer 
the arbitration and such substitute can arrange organs to carry out 
similar functions to those carried out by the different parts of the 
ICC apparatus, there should be no practical problem, as well as 
no objection in principle, to providing for such a hybrid ad hoc 
arbitration administered by one institution but governed by the 
rules (as adapted where necessary) of another. This freedom is 
inherent in the flexible nature of arbitration, especially ad hoc 
arbitration. In any case, inefficiency alone cannot render a clause 
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180 10(2) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 141 [2017 
	
invalid so long as the parties had agreed and intended for the 
arbitration to be conducted in this manner.233 
 
For the purposes of the present investigation, it is striking that the 
Singapore Court of Appeal did not consider the ‘mix and match’ arbitration 
to be institutional in nature, but rather an ad hoc proceeding of a particular 
kind. 234  More precisely, it spoke of an “hybrid ad hoc arbitration 
administered by one institution but governed by the rules (as adapted where 
necessary) of another”.235 While authors have generally agreed that any 
arbitration conducted under the ICC Rules but not administered by the ICC 
cannot qualify as an ICC arbitration,236 the Singapore Court of Appeal went 
further by ruling that it constitutes no institutional arbitration at all. 
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal did not elaborate on the reasons 
underlying its approach. Commentators have noted that the High Court in 
Insigma did not use the term “ad hoc arbitration” to refer to arbitration that 
is not administered by an arbitral institution, as is most frequently done,237 
but in order to refer to an arbitration that “is conducted pursuant to rules 
agreed by the parties themselves or laid down by the arbitral tribunal”238—
but not, one could add, pursuant to rules laid down by an arbitral 
institution. 239  Based on this relatively broad understanding of ad hoc 
arbitration, the High Court essentially treated the arbitration rules agreed by 
the parties as an ad hoc version of the ICC Rules.240 
(b) Exxon Neftegas v. WorleyParsons ¾ In Exxon Neftegas,241 parties 
had mixed and matched the ICC Rules with the proceedings’ administration 
by the AAA. In spite of the arbitration agreement, Exxon brought a suit in a 
New York court. WorleyParsons filed a motion to stay and to compel 
arbitration in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and at the same 
time commenced an arbitration before the ICC under the ICC Rules. Exxon 
																																								 																				
233 Insigma v. Alstom, supra note 2, ¶ 35. 
234 Willems, supra note 59, at 405. 
235 Id. 
236  FRY ET AL., supra note 156, ¶ 3-194; Perales Viscasillas, supra note 8, at 37; Reiner & 
Aschauer, supra note 180, ¶ 28. 
237 Kirby, supra note 21, at 324. 
238 Insigma v. Alstom 2008, supra note 224, ¶ 31. 
239 See also id. ¶ 25:  
 
It is obvious from the clause, taking an objective view of its wording, that the parties 
did not bargain for an ICC institutional arbitration, but for an SIAC administered one 
and even that was not to be institutional in nature because they intended the SIAC to 
apply the rules of the ICC in administering the proceedings. By specifying a different 
set of procedural rules that was not the SIAC’s in-house rules, the parties showed 
their desire for an ad hoc arbitration. 
 
240 Kirby, supra note 21, at 327. 
241 Exxon v. Worley Parsons, supra note 226. 
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opposed the motion to stay the court proceedings, and in addition filed a 
cross-motion to stay the ICC arbitration. The Supreme Court of the State of 
New York’s order was two-pronged: 
First, it directed the parties to have “any arbitration administered by the 
American Arbitration under the ICC Rules [i.e., in exact compliance with 
the wording of their arbitration clause], with the parties to seek the court’s 
assistance if they are unable to agree to any modifications of the ICC Rules 
required for AAA administration”. In contrast to the Singapore High Court 
in Insigma, the court in Exxon Neftegas did not address whether the 
arbitration resulting from the mix and match clause accompanied by 
necessary rules modification would be institutional or ad hoc. (Under the 
standards of Insigma, it would arguably be ad hoc.) 
Second, the court held that “[i]f the AAA is unwilling or unable for any 
reason to administer the arbitration under the ICC Rules, the reference to 
the ICC Rules in the arbitration clause in the Engineering Agreement is 
severed and the parties shall arbitrate pursuant to arbitration rules 
designated by the AAA according to its procedures.”242 In doing so, the 
court made clear that it considered the parties’ choice of the administering 
institution as more important than their choice of institutional rules. 
Furthermore, it stressed two factors that were to determine the nature of the 
arbitration proceeding to arise from the unmodified “mix and match” 
clause: The administering arbitral institution’s right to decide whether it 
wants to administer an arbitration under another institution’s rules, and, in 
case it is unwilling to do so, the administering institution’s right to 
designate the arbitration rules to be used in the proceedings. By focusing on 
the arbitral institution’s right to decide as the factor of last resort, the court 
in Exxon Neftegas essentially confirmed the importance of the institution’s 
“gatekeeper function” identified earlier.243 
4. Lessons Learned for the Distinction Between Arbitration Categories 
¾ The curious cases of ‘mix and match’ arbitrations provide us with 
additional insight into the factors relevant for the distinction between 
arbitration categories. While the scholarly discussion in this respect is still 
developing, case law244  has clarified that a combination of one arbitral 
institution’s rules with a case administration by another arbitral institution 
does not a fortiori make the respective arbitration institutional, but rather 
ad hoc. This confirms that the mere combination of any institution’s 
administration with any institution’s rules is not enough for an arbitration 
to qualify as institutional, in spite of these two components appearing in 
most traditional “institutional arbitration” definitions.245  Insigma thereby 
																																								 																				
242 Id. 
243 Supra Section IV.C.5. 
244 Supra Section IV.D.3. 
245 Supra Section II.B. 
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stands in conformity with the prevailing view on arbitrations in which the 
parties have chosen an arbitral institution without its institutional rules, that 
are generally categorized as ad hoc246—according to Insigma, this approach 
similarly applies to the party choice of an arbitral institution (here: the 
SIAC) together with arbitration rules issued by a different institution (here: 
the ICC Rules). In other words, it is only the combination of an arbitral 
institutions with the application of its own institutional rules that makes an 
arbitration institutional. In addition, the case law on “mix and match” 
arbitrations confirms the widely-agreed notion that ad hoc arbitration is the 
default category, 247  while institutional arbitration is the exceptional 
category. 
The maybe most interesting lesson to be learned from “mix and match” 
arbitrations is the importance that court decisions give to arbitral 
institutions’ decision-making power. In Insigma, the court stressed that the 
arbitration agreement “was rendered certain and workable by the SIAC 
agreeing to administer the arbitration under the ICC Rules,” 248 before 
concluding: “In our view, the only aspect of uncertainty or inoperability 
with regard to the Arbitration Agreement was the contingency of the SIAC 
declining to administer the arbitration according to the ICC Rules . . . .”249 
In focusing on the institution’s decision to administer or not to administer 
the hybrid arbitration, the court’s reasoning ran parallel to the French 
court’s approach in Samsung Electronics. 250  It thereby confirms the 
significance of arbitral institutions’ gatekeeper function outlined earlier,251 
given that only SIAC`s decision to administer the arbitration under the ICC 
Rules enabled the arbitration to proceed, albeit in form of an ad hoc 
arbitration. (The change from one arbitration category to the other resulted 
from the combination of one institution’s rules with another institution’s 
administration, a distinguishing factor not present in case of attempted 
deviations from other non-derogatable institutional rules, as eg in Samsung 
Electronics.) A focus on the arbitral institution’s gatekeeper function is also 
apparent in Exxon Neftegas, when the Supreme Court of the State of New 
York orders the parties to “arbitrate pursuant to arbitration rules designated 
by the AAA according to its procedures”, “[i]f the AAA is unwilling or 
unable for any reason to administer the arbitration under the ICC Rules”.252 
By explicitly declaring the institution’s unwillingness to administer the 
hybrid (ad hoc) arbitration sufficient for the proceedings to continue under 
the AAA’s auspices pursuant to AAA-designated institutional rules (and 
																																								 																				
246 Supra Section IV.B.2. 
247 Supra Section II.C. 
248 Insigma v. Alstom, supra note 2, ¶¶ 5, 40 (emphasis added). 
249 Id. ¶ 40 (emphasis added). 
250 Supra Section IV.C.5. 
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therefore arguably as an institutional arbitration), the court in Exxon 
Neftegas similarly looked to the arbitral institution’s power to make a 
decision that binds both parties. Finally, and in the same spirit, the 
Singapore High Court in HKL Group Co. Ltd. v Rizq International 
Holdings Pte. Ltd. considered a “mix and match” arbitration clause to be 
workable and not null and void if the parties were “able to secure the 
agreement of an arbitral institution” to conduct a hybrid arbitration as 
described in the clause 253 —by leaving the decision to administer an 
arbitration under rules other than its in-house arbitration rules to the 
unnamed institution’s discretion, the court in essence acknowledged its 
gatekeeper function. 
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE DEFINITION OF ARBITRATION 
CATEGORIES 
In order to identify consequences to be drawn for the definition of 
arbitration categories, it is helpful to first briefly summarize the lessons 
learned from the treatment of the four groups of borderline cases.254 Based 
on these results, a novel definition of ‘institutional arbitration’ will then be 
outlined.255 
A. Summary of the Lessons Learned from Borderline Cases 
On one hand, the earlier discussions have demonstrated that a party 
agreement on an arbitral institution alone does not give an arbitration an 
‘institutional’ character, as long as it does not encompass the application of 
that institution’s arbitration rules.256 On the other hand, neither the use of a 
pre-existing set of arbitration rules (like the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules)257 nor the use of institutional arbitration rules alone (i.e., without the 
use of the issuing institution’s services)258 suffice to make an arbitration 
“institutional”. As an intermediate result, it is therefore clear that both the 
use of institutional arbitration rules and the involvement of an arbitral 
institution are necessary for an arbitration to be “institutional”—a 
requirement reflected in some, but not all traditional textbook 
definitions.259 
Since the Insigma case, we furthermore know that the combination of 
one institution’s administration with another institution’s rules results in an 
																																								 																				
253 HKL v. Rizq, supra note 222, at ¶¶ 29, 37. 
254 Infra Section V.A. 
255 Infra Section V.B. 
256 Supra Section IV.B.2. 
257 Supra Section IV.A.1. 
258 Supra Section IV.B.1. 
259 Cf. supra Section II.B. 
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ad hoc arbitration,260 meaning that an institutional arbitration presupposes 
the proceeding’s administration by an arbitral institution under that very 
institution’s own arbitration rules. 
The last and arguably most difficult question concerns the type of 
institutional involvement necessary to give an arbitration an institutional 
character. It has become clear that an arbitral institution’s role as a mere 
appointing authority under either the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or 
domestic arbitration law is in any case insufficient for that purpose.261 
Something more is required, which at the same time means that not every 
involvement of an arbitral institution makes an arbitration institutional. In 
searching for the threshold of a sufficient institutional involvement, a focus 
on the degree of administrative services offered has proven unhelpful, as no 
workable minimum standard could be identified.262 Instead, the Samsung 
Electronics case demonstrated that it is an arbitral institution’s power to 
make binding decisions on certain procedural matters, having been 
delegated to the institution by the parties through their agreement on the 
institution’s arbitration rules, that makes an arbitration “institutional”.263 
Such a delegated power to decide provides the arbitral institution with the 
authority to protect certain characteristic and therefore non-derogatable 
features of that institution’s arbitration (referred to here as “gatekeeper 
function”), thereby restricting the parties’ autonomy to design their dispute 
resolution proceedings more than it is restricted in ad hoc arbitration, where 
merely the lex arbitri’s mandatory rules must be observed. The crucial role 
of an arbitral institution’s power to make procedural decisions binding on 
the parties has been confirmed by case law on “mix and match” 
arbitrations, in particular in the Insigma and the Exxon Neftegas case.264 
Finally, the discussion of borderline cases has confirmed that the 
traditionally prevailing approach of distinguishing between merely two 
categories of arbitration—ad hoc arbitration on one hand, and institutional 
arbitration on the other265—continues to be convincing, even in the face of 
borderline constellations that may be difficult to qualify. In other words, it 
is neither necessary nor helpful for the purposes identified earlier266 to 
introduce further (e.g., “hybrid”) categories of arbitration. Among the two 
arbitration categories, ad hoc arbitration functions as the default category. 
It comprises all arbitrations that lack a sufficient involvement of arbitral 
institutions or of their institutional rules, among them arbitrations with 
																																								 																				
260 Supra Sections IV.D.3.a. & IV.D.4. 
261 Supra Section IV.A.2. 
262 Supra Section IV.A.3. 
263 Supra Sections IV.C.4. & IV.C.5. 
264 Supra Sections IV.D.3. & IV.D.4. 
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some institutional involvement, but not of an institution with the necessary 
“gatekeeper function”. 
B. Novel Definition of Institutional Arbitration 
1. The Definition ¾ In light of the lessons learned, a novel definition 
of “institutional arbitration” could read as follows: “An arbitration is 
institutional if the parties, by agreeing on an institution’s arbitration rules, 
have delegated to this arbitral institution the power to make binding 
decisions on certain procedural matters.” Any arbitration not or no longer 
fulfilling these requirements is an ad hoc arbitration. 
2. Explanation of the Definition ¾ The components of the definition 
proposed here require a brief explanation. 
(a) Arbitral Institution’s Power to Make Binding Decisions ¾ The 
crucial factor in an institutional arbitration is the respective arbitral 
institution’s power to make binding decisions, its “gatekeeper function”. 
By focusing on the institution’s decision-making power and not on the 
administrative services rendered by the institution, the definition reflects 
lessons learned from case law on party agreements excluding “mandatory” 
(non-derogatable) institutional rules267 and on “mix and match” arbitration 
agreements. 268  At the same time, it avoids the difficulties arising from 
measuring the type and degree of administrative services offered by an 
institution.269 In other words, the present definition does not focus on which 
tasks an administering institution provides (quantitative approach), but 
rather on how it administers its arbitrations (qualitative approach). An 
institution’s “gatekeeper function” that results from its power to make 
binding decisions enables it to prevent party derogations from the core of 
its institutional arbitration rules, thereby protecting the characteristic 
features its institutional arbitrations. Although the gatekeeper function 
thereby restricts party autonomy in institutional arbitration more than it is 
restricted in ad hoc arbitration, its serves not only the institution’s self-
interest270 by protecting its “brand”,271 but also has advantages for parties, 
arbitrators, supervising State courts and the interested public: By somewhat 
standardising each institution’s institutional arbitrations, its guarantees the 
foreseeability of a particular institutional arbitration’s core characteristics, 
thereby creating a reliable point of reference for an institutional award’s 
																																								 																				
267 Supra Section IV.C.4. 
268 Supra Section IV.D.3. 
269 Supra Section IV.A.3.c. 
270 See the oft-quoted remark by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Insigma v. Alstom, supra note 2, 
¶ 26 (“Party autonomy should trump institutional self-interest.”). 
271 See id. ¶ 36 (“We would agree that branding in services is just as crucial as the branding of 
products.”). 
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extra cachet. 272  In contrast, the gatekeeper function does not primarily 
protect an arbitration’s minimum standard of fairness, as notably the 
parties’ right to be heard and the arbitrators’ impartiality: As such 
minimum standards must be similarly observed in ad hoc arbitration, they 
are guaranteed by the mandatory rules of the lex arbitri273 and enforced by 
the competent State courts. Insofar, a gatekeeping institution’s actions may 
well result in an additional extra layer of protection, but are not the primary 
purpose of its gatekeeper function. 
A focus on an arbitral institution’s decision-making power is as such 
not entirely new in the present context. As far back as 1967, Professor 
Lalive considered it decisive for institutional arbitration that the institution 
“ne se contente pas de mettre à la disposition des parties son règlement de 
procédure, ses locaux, ses services administratifs, mais qu’il se réserve lui-
même une compétence dans I’application dudit règlement arbitral.”274 His 
definition differed from the approach suggested here by not requiring the 
power to make binding decisions, but seemingly letting any institutional 
competence (“une competence”) suffice. More recently, another author has 
also regarded the institution’s decisional powers as important, 275  but 
focused on whether exercising these powers is “outcome-determinative”.276 
By requiring an arbitral institution’s power to make “binding” 
decisions, the institution’s gatekeeper function as suggested here assumes a 
decision-making power that goes beyond the legal authority to bind merely 
one of the parties. An institution’s power of the (insufficient) latter type is 
present in any institution operating as appointing authority under either 
institutional arbitration rules, under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 
under a tailor-made ad hoc arbitration arrangement or under domestic 
arbitration laws: For example, an appointing authority’s decision to appoint 
an arbitrator where a party has failed to appoint one in time277 is binding on 
the inactive party, an appointing authority’s decision on the challenge of an 
arbitrator278 is binding on the party that had appointed the arbitrator and has 
not agreed to the challenge, and an appointing authority’s decision to 
appoint a substitute arbitrator279 is binding on a party that has failed to 
exercise its right to appoint or to participate in the appointment of the 
substitute arbitrator. However, in each of these cases both parties in theory 
have the right to jointly deviate from the appointing authority’s decision by 
																																								 																				
272 See supra Section III.B. 
273 See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 49, art. 18. 
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agreeing on a different arbitrator, as unlikely as this may seem in practice. 
An arbitral institution’s decisions made as an appointing authority are 
accordingly not binding on both parties, but merely on the party whose 
inactivity gave rise to the decision in the first place. The same is arguably 
true for an appointing authority’s decision to appoint a sole arbitrator where 
the parties had not agreed on the number of arbitrators, as allowed under 
Article 7(2) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, because the parties 
can reach a contrary (and prevailing) agreement after the appointing 
authority’s decision has been made. 
In contrast, the gatekeeper function developed here requires more, 
namely the authority to bind both parties to an arbitration even where they 
act in agreement. In other words, the arbitral institution’s decision has to be 
binding for the parties in the sense that they cannot deviate from the 
decision, even if both parties should agree on such a deviation. When 
construed in this way, the institution’s gatekeeper function restricts 
procedural party autonomy in institutional arbitrations, and thereby 
guarantees that certain characteristic features of the institution’s arbitration 
procedure280 are always preserved. 
Whether and to which extent a particular arbitral institution possesses 
decision-making powers as envisaged here is not always easy to determine. 
Only occasionally institutional arbitration rules clearly address the 
question, as in case of Article 29.1 of the 2014 LCIA Rules: By expressly 
providing that “[t]he determinations of the LCIA Court with respect to all 
matters relating to the arbitration shall be conclusive and binding upon the 
parties and the Arbitral Tribunal, unless otherwise directed by the LCIA 
Court”, the 2014 LCIA Rules specifically grant the institution the power to 
make decisions that are binding on both parties. Under other institutional 
rules, the issue remains a matter of interpretation, with non-derogatable 
(“mandatory”) provisions 281  being a important indicative factor in this 
respect. 
(b) On Certain Procedural Matters ¾ The topic of the arbitral 
institution’s required decision-making power has deliberately been framed 
in a non-specific manner (“on certain procedural matters”). Imposing a 
minimum content in this regard appears to be both unnecessary and 
inappropriate because a particular institution’s decision-making power does 
not protect characteristics of institutional arbitration in general, but the 
indispensable features of proceedings administered by the institution 
concerned. 
By way of clarification, it should be pointed out that an institution’s 
power to decide on its own administrative fees or on the arbitrators’ 
																																								 																				
280 On the topics covered by the institution’s decision-making power, see infra Section V.B.2.b. 
281 See, e.g., supra Section IV.C.2. 
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remuneration – often named as one of the main advantages of institutional 
over ad hoc arbitration282—is insufficient for the present purpose. The 
reason is that these decisions do not concern the procedural relationship 
between the parties, but rather their relationship to the administering 
institution or the arbitrators. Put differently: The fixing of the arbitral 
institution’s administrative fees as well as of the arbitrators’ remuneration 
isn’t a matter of the parties’ autonomy in the first place, because the 
institution (respectively the arbitrators) always have to agree to the fees 
suggested by the parties. Decision-making powers with regard to this issue 
are accordingly also found in rules designed for ad hoc proceedings, as 
notably the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules that authorize the appointing 
authority to make adjustments to the arbitral tribunal’s proposal about the 
determination of its fees and expenses 283  and/or the arbitral tribunal’s 
subsequent determination of fees and expenses 284 —decisions that 
Articles 41(3) and (4)(c) of the 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
expressly declare to be “binding upon the arbitral tribunal”, without the 
parties being mentioned. 
The definition’s reference to “procedural” matters clarifies that no 
institutional decision-making power is required with respect to the 
substance of the dispute. This task—of course—rests with the arbitral 
tribunal only, in ad hoc as in institutional arbitration (however defined). 
(c) Delegation of the Decision-Making Power by the Parties ¾ Under 
the present definition, the arbitral institution’s power to render binding 
decisions on procedural matters has to follow from the parties’ delegation. 
It is therefore a creature of party autonomy, as much as international 
arbitration in general and the choice between ad hoc and institutional 
arbitration in particular.285 Only by granting an institution such a power, the 
parties can lend their arbitration an institutional character. In contrast, 
arbitral institutions designated as statutory appointing authorities in some 
jurisdictions286 draw their decision-making powers not from the parties’ 
delegation, but from the lex arbitri. If such an arbitration law authorizes 
them to render procedural decisions binding on both parties, this statutory 
power will not make the arbitrations concerned institutional in nature. 
The relevant factor should be the parties’ delegation of powers, rather 
than their actual use by the arbitral institution in the proceedings concerned. 
This is necessary in order to enable the parties to foresee their arbitration’s 
type at the moment they conclude the arbitration agreement. In addition, 
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focusing on the exercise of an institution’s decision-making power would 
result in the arbitration potentially changing its nature in the course of the 
proceedings, a result that would not sit well with “category exclusive” 
provisions of law attaching legal consequences to the arbitration 
category.287 
(d) By Agreeing on Institutional Arbitration Rules ¾ It is a difficult 
question whether such a delegation of decision powers necessarily must 
occur through institutional arbitration rules in order to make the arbitration 
“institutional”, 288  or whether a delegation by way of other contractual 
agreements would also suffice.289 The definition suggested here adopts the 
first approach in order to reflect the Singapore courts’ position in Insigma, 
where the delegation of powers to the SIAC by way of the parties’ “mix 
and match” arbitration agreement was viewed as an insufficient base for an 
institutional arbitration, resulting in the SIAC-administered arbitration 
under the ICC Rules being categorized as ad hoc.290 From the perspective 
of party autonomy, this requirement can be questioned, given that an 
individual agreement of this kind is an equally valid (and, due to its specific 
nature, arguably even stronger) delegation of decision-making power. 
However, considerations of foreseeability support a limitation to 
delegations via institutional rules, because it reserves the institutional 
arbitration category to proceedings in accordance with an institution’s 
usual, off-the-shelf procedures.  
As a related requirement also resulting from the Insigma decisions,291 
the decision-making power must have been delegated through institutional 
arbitration rules to the very institution that has issued these rules (“have 
delegated to this arbitral institution”), and not to a different institution. 
(e) Consequence of an Arbitration not Being in Conformity with the 
Definition ¾ If a given arbitration does not conform to the suggested 
definition as explained here, it is not an “institutional”, but an ad hoc 
arbitration. The same is true if the arbitration was commenced as an 
institutional arbitration, but the parties continue the proceedings in defiance 
of a binding decision by the arbitral institution: In such a case, the 
arbitration is no longer institutional, but ad hoc. (It is a separate question 
not to be discussed here in detail, whether their arbitration agreement 
obliges the parties to continue the arbitration ad hoc—this essentially 
depends on the interpretation of the arbitration agreement.292)  
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The limited consequences of an arbitration at first sight appearing to be 
“institutional”, but not meeting the requirements for this category confirm 
that the present definition is merely concerned with the delimitation of an 
arbitration category, but neither with the validity of arbitral agreements nor 
their capability of being performed.293 Put differently: In an institutional 
arbitration in the sense defined here, the institution is exclusively 
“gatekeeping” the arbitration’s institutional character, not the parties’ 
access to arbitration in general. 
Finally, the present definition maintains the long-standing dichotomy 
of institutional and ad hoc arbitration, thereby confirming that no third or 
further categories of arbitration are needed.294 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The distinction between institutional arbitration on the one hand and ad 
hoc arbitration on the other is a basic truth of arbitration theory and 
practice. Used primarily for descriptive purposes, the precise delimitations 
of these two traditional arbitration categories are not often investigated. 
The present article has attempted to gather some insights into the factors 
that make an arbitration “institutional” or “ad hoc” by looking at four 
groups of borderline cases: Arbitrations conducted under a preexisting set 
of arbitration rules, but without or with only limited involvement of an 
arbitral institution acting as appointing authority or providing 
administrative services; isolated party choices of only institutional rules or 
only an arbitral institution; the modification of institutional arbitration rules 
by the parties (and the limit of “mandatory” provisions in those rules); and 
“mix and match” arbitrations combining one institution’s arbitration rules 
with the proceedings’ administration by a different arbitral institution. 
The discussion of these borderline cases in case law and by scholars 
throws some light upon the nature of the different modes of arbitration. The 
conclusions drawn have resulted in the development of a novel definition 
of “institutional” arbitration that focuses on certain arbitral institutions’ 
“gatekeeping function”. Under this definition, not every arbitration 
involving an arbitral institution or institutional rules qualifies as 
“institutional”, but only those arbitrations in which the parties have 
delegated to an arbitral institution the power to make binding decisions on 
certain procedural matters. The result of comparative research of 
international arbitration law and practice, the definition presented here 
cannot necessarily be used tel quel for the construction of domestic and 
international provisions addressing institutional arbitration. By contributing 
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to the ongoing discussion about arbitration categories, the present article 
has already fulfilled its purpose. 
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